

Afghan Right: Linking a Stable Economic and Industrial Base to a Self Sustaining ANA Logistics Adjusted to Afghan Culture

**A Monograph
by
MAJ Douglas C. Richter
U.S. Army**



**School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

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MAJ Douglas C. Richter

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Approved by:

Eric R. Price

Monograph Director

Thomas E. Ward II, Ph.D.

Second Reader

Wayne W. Grisgby, COL, IN

Director,
School of Advanced
Military Studies

Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

Director,
Graduate Degree
Programs

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Abstract

Afghan Right: Linking a Stable Economic and Industrial Base to a Self Sustaining ANA Logistics Adjusted to Afghan Culture, by Major Douglas C. Richter, U.S. Army, 58 pages

The ultimate success of the United States and North Atlantic Treaty Organization mission in Afghanistan relies on transitioning responsibility for security to the Afghan National Security Forces, primarily the Afghan National Army. The US and NATO have built an ANA of 134,000 personnel to assume the security mission. However, the ANA requires a logistical system that is capable of sustaining it after the departure of Coalition forces by 2014. The key elements of a self-sustaining ANA are a strong economic and industrial base linked to a logistical system that leverages the stronger elements of Afghan culture. The ANA logistical system must project sustainment from the national depots to the tactical units fighting insurgents in the rural areas.

Afghan culture is described using Geert Hofstede's cultural dimensions. The Afghan Ministry of Defense has decreed the establishment of a western style demand-supported distribution-based logistical system. The establishment of this system is recognized as a cultural challenge since the western system relies on the principles of anticipation, responsiveness, and economy that clash with the stronger aspects of Afghan culture. Next, the monograph describes the current state of ANA logistical system and recommended adjustment in terms of a regionally focused, modified structure to reduce delays, and development of an Installation Management Agency-like garrison structure.

The ANA logistical system requires a stable economic and industrial base to provide materiel and funding for its facilities throughout the country. Afghanistan published a National Development Strategy in 2008 that represents an Afghan lead on a holistic approach to reaching the government's development objectives. Comparing the US mission to Greece in 1947 to the current US operation in Afghanistan illustrates techniques for building an economic and industrial base that can generate the revenues required to sustain the ANA in the post coalition era. This comparison also identifies some of the obstacles to establishing the revenue base to include the lack of an Afghan lead on developmental projects, the complexity of regional relationships with India, Pakistan, China, and Iran, poor security conditions, and the Afghan cultural connection of wealth to power.

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Introduction

The United States and its North American Treaty Organization (NATO) allies have now been involved in Afghanistan for more than eight years. In that time, the coalition's focus has gradually shifted from defeating the Taliban and its ensuing insurgency to building the Afghan National Army (ANA) into a force that is capable of providing security for the nation. However, long-term success means that Afghanistan must be able to sustain its forces after the departure of NATO forces, or it will suffer the same fate it experienced after the Soviets departed and removed their financial support of the central government. Therefore the United States and NATO must build not only the capacity within the security forces to secure the borders and maintain internal security, but must also ensure that there is the logistical support structure to sustain those forces after coalition forces depart. More importantly, that logistical support structure must rest upon solid industrial and economic bases that provide for the material needs of the ANA while simultaneously providing for the economic needs of the nation. Further, NATO must build the structure to operate within the cultural contexts of the Afghans themselves.

Unfortunately, current efforts to create a sustainable Afghan Army center solely on military logistics organizations and rely too heavily on Western methods for managing military logistics—an approach that will likely be abandoned immediately after NATO's departure. President Barak Obama's announced 2014 withdrawal deadline and the likelihood of failure exacerbate the urgent need to get these tasks right.¹ Failure to address broader issues of sustainability, such as cultural considerations, infrastructure, manufacturing, and a national-level logistics support structure to support the Afghan Army will likely delay departure of NATO forces from Afghanistan. How does NATO build a self-sustaining ANA between now and the projected drawdown in 2014? If history is an indicator, the training and organizing of Afghan

¹ Nancy Youssef, "Under New Plan: US Troops will stay in Afghanistan until 2014," *McClatchy Newspapers*, November 16, 2010, <http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2010/11/16/103844/under-new-plan-us-troops-will.html> (accessed February 27, 2011).

forces to mirror Western doctrinal standards requires more time than the current timeline allows. A South Korea that strongly identified with and accepted U.S. military standards took decades to create a similar sustainment base for its own Army. Inherent in the problem are the cultural differences between Westerners and Afghans. Cultural change occurs over generations, and the strong resistance to ideas and values considered alien is a recurring theme in the history of Afghanistan. Unless the approach for Army logistics operations and the larger sustaining structure is modified to account for some of the particular aspects of Afghan culture, the Afghan government will likely abandon the system after coalition forces depart Afghanistan, resulting in a failure of the security forces themselves.

Therefore, creating a self-sustaining ANA in the time available requires the U.S. and NATO to create the key conditions for long term success - a stable economic and industrial base that provides the government with steady revenue that can support the military's sustainment needs at the national level, and a military logistics structure that is optimized for employment within the context of established Afghan cultural values. NATO must build sustainment forces and the industrial base in a manner that combines the best of Western logistics operations with the types of power relationships and distribution typical in Afghan culture.

The security provided by a professional military and economic stability through economic opportunity represents a symbiotic relationship in which each element increases the capacity of the national government to sustain its military, thereby its sovereignty, in the post coalition era. Afghanistan's military logistical system must be adjusted now in its early stages to adopt a regional emphasis that allows for a successful merger of Western doctrine and Afghan culture. The military requires logistical organizations and supporting doctrine that can project sustainment over poor roads from the corps garrison to the tactical unit fighting insurgents in rugged terrain. Simultaneously, Afghanistan and her strategic partners must intensify the focus of their collective efforts to strengthen Afghanistan's nascent economic and industrial base so that it can provide both the funding and the manufacturing capacity to provide the material required to

sustain the military. An Afghan-centered approach to expand the base in a holistic fashion that embraces NATO and international investment is the crucial element to introducing meaningful improvements in the small districts and scattered villages. These locations are the key terrain in the fight to defeat and ultimately reconcile with the insurgent elements. Consideration and application of Afghan cultural values throughout these efforts are relevant because they govern the rate of acceptance and implementation of foreign ideas. Unfortunately, building and training a professional military is a time consuming and arduous process. In spite of the years spent in Afghanistan, the increased focus on building Afghan security and sustainment capacity has only recently gained momentum. In a similar effort in which U.S. advisors sought to create security capacity in the Republic of Korea (ROK) from 1946 to 1953, challenges of personnel shortfalls, political objectives, developing the advisory relationships, and operating primarily with a U.S. approach are similar to the challenges faced in Afghanistan.² Further, while the U.S. faced similar challenges, the level of success in the ROK within an equivalent eight-year period was considerably higher.³ A key difference in the level of success attained in the two missions is a cultural one. Heterogeneous Afghanistan has a complicated culture that resists change and alien ideas while the more homogenous Korean, rooted in the years of oppressive occupation of their country, was an adaptive culture that accepted the recommendations of the U.S. advisors fairly quickly after the invasion by northern troops.⁴

This paper will examine the genesis of the current plans for creating the ANA and its supporting logistical system and explore ways in which to leverage Afghan culture and economic development to ensure that Afghanistan's military will be able to sustain itself in the post-coalition era. The first part of the examination will include a review of the policy directives that

² Matthew Farmer, "Afghan Tortoise, South Korean Hare: Advising in Hard and Soft Cultures" (Fort Leavenworth: School of Advanced Military Studies, US Army Command and General staff College, 2009), 5, 6, 10, 11.

³ Ibid., 11.

⁴ Ibid., Abstract, 59.

established the ANA and drive the current training mission and will explore the current status of the ANA logistics system from the Afghan Ministry of Defense (MoD) down to the tactical logistics support unit. The paper will then explore the doctrine being implemented to support this logistics system and will identify areas of tension between American logistics doctrine and Afghan cultural norms that necessitate adjustments to doctrine implementation so that it will work within Afghan norms rather than working against them. Incorporating the deeply held norms and values of the indigenous culture into the structures and doctrine of Afghanistan's military logistics organizations will improve the chances that the adoption of these units and methods will continue after coalition forces depart. Finally, the paper will build a case for a more holistic development of Afghanistan's economic and industrial base in order to generate revenues to sustain the ANA and eventually provide for their military materiel needs as well. In examining the role that economic development could play in Afghanistan's internal security, the paper will use a case study of the U.S. mission in 1949 in Greece as a successful example of rapid economic and industrial development combined with effective security force assistance during an insurgency that ultimately led to a stable and secure nation. By gaining a better understanding of the role of culture in doctrine and organizational design, and applying proven techniques to increase security force sustainability through economic and industrial development, the paper aims to recommend adjustments to the current effort that will help the U.S. and NATO to build the self-sustaining ANA needed to allow a rapid departure of coalition forces. More importantly, these insights provide a way to create institutions that are sustainable after the coalition's departure. By contrast, failure to adjust the current efforts to develop ANA logistical system will force NATO and the U.S. to make politically and financially difficult decisions regarding the transition of security operations to the ANA and its immature logistical system as scheduled in 2014.

The Afghan National Army

Afghan, U.S., and NATO policy establishes a clear time imperative to transition security operations from NATO to the ANA by 2014, yet each of these policy statements define transition in terms of a process that is event-driven.⁵ Transition of the security mission is dependent on the fielding of ANA forces in order to start training alongside U.S. and NATO partner units. Ideally, NATO transitions security operations to ANA combat units that are capable of operating independently of NATO advisors.

Realistically, NATO and U.S. advisors will likely remain in Afghanistan after 2014, which will be politically acceptable if the ANA forces are leading security operations. To date, NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) has assumed risk by making a conscious decision to stand up combat forces and delay training of enabler units such as logistics, signal, and engineer.⁶ The assumption has been that Afghan combat forces can train with coalition units and assume the security mission now while NTM-A raises, equips, and fields the enabler units.. This is clearly an interim measure because the stated ANA mission is somewhat larger than

⁵ Nick Schiffrin, "Afghanistan President Pledges to Take Control of Security by 2014," *ABC News, International*, 20 July 2010, <http://abcnews.go.com/International/president-hamid-karzai-pledges-afghanistan-security-2014/story?id=11208702> (accessed February 6, 2010); North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "NATO and Afghanistan launch transition and embark on a new long term partnership," NATO/Newsroom/News, November 20, 2010, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-98A31676-5E42912C/natolive/news_68728.htm (accessed February 10, 2010). "Afghan forces will begin taking the lead for security operations. This will begin in certain districts and provinces, and based on conditions, will gradually expand throughout the country. The aim is for the Afghan forces to be in the lead countrywide by the end of 2014."

⁶ U.S. Department of Defense, Inspector General. *Report on the Assessment of US and Coalition Plans to Train, Equip, and Field the Afghan National Security Forces*, (September 2009), 30, 91, http://www.dodig.mil/spo/Reports/SPO2009-007_final.pdf (accessed September 25, 2010); U.S. Department of Defense, *United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghan National Security Forces*, (June 2008), 6, http://www.defense.gov/pubs/united_states_plan_for_sustaining_the_afghanistan_national_security_forces_1231.pdf (accessed August 30, 2010); The NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan (NTM-A), NATO Training Mission Afghanistan is responsible for raising and conducting institutional training of ANA and Afghan National Police forces. NTM-A is also responsible for coordinating with NATO and other nations to provide advisors and mentorship teams. NTM-A currently has responsibility for development of the ANA, published a campaign plan in June 2008. NTM-A's plan follows three lines of operations: 1) build and develop ministerial institutional capability, 2) generate the fielded forces, 3) and develop the fielded forces. Other CSS units have been retrained as combat units in order to meet manning requirements.

defeating insurgent forces.⁷ Current estimates indicate that 171,000 troops are needed to enable the U.S. to transition the lead in internal security operations to the ANA.⁸ NATO is not concerned with the ANA capacity for securing the border or deterring external threats.

Though the focus to date has been on generating Afghan combat power, NTM-A recognizes that ANA logistics self-sufficiency is a crucial element of NATO withdrawal.⁹ Until NTM-A builds, trains, and equips the Combat Service Support (CSS) units, they and the ANA cannot begin the long road to self-sufficiency. Between now and 2014, the General Accounting Office (GAO) reports training efforts for the next 37,000 troops will focus on “rebalancing the force by adding specialist units [including] logistics battalions.”¹⁰ Therefore, the ANA must be fully engaged in developing units in the field by that time. Unfortunately, the time imperative imposed by U.S. and Afghan political interests forces a culturally challenging sustainment organization and doctrine on the ANA.

⁷ Jan Erik Haug, “The Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team Program as an Effective Model for Assisting the Development of an Effective Afghan National Army” (Fort Leavenworth: US Army Command and General Staff College, 2009), 90. President Karzai has stated the ANA must 1) secure the borders and deter external threats; 2) to defeat terrorist forces; 3) disband, reintegrate, or imprison Illegal Armed Groups; 4) to manage internal security threats and emergencies in cooperation with the Afghan National Police.

⁸ International Security and Transition Force, “ANSF,” ISAF Website, Newsroom, Facts and Figures, 1, http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/stories/File/factsheets/1667-10_ANSF_LR_en2.pdf (accessed September 10, 2010); GAO Report, *Afghanistan Security: Afghan Army Growing, but Additional Trainers Needed, long Term Costs Not Determined*, GAO-11-66, (January 2011), 10, <http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-66>, (accessed February 10, 2011); U.S. Department of Defense, Inspector General. *Report on the Assessment of US and Coalition Plans to Train, Equip, and Field the Afghan National Security Forces*, (September 2009), 91, http://www.dodig.mil/spo/Reports/SPO2009-007_final.pdf (accessed September 25, 2010). The ANA reached 134,000 troops in July 2010, three months ahead the planned time for this number. Enabler units are Combat Support (CS) such as engineer, signal, and Combat Service Support (CSS) logistics units at the brigade and corps level. Their capabilities enable the maneuver commander to execute his primary mission.

⁹ U.S. Department of Defense, *United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghan National Security Forces*, (June 2008), 6, http://www.defense.gov/pubs/united_states_plan_for_sustaining_the_afghanistan_national_security_forces_1231.pdf (accessed August 30, 2010); U.S. Department of Defense, Inspector General. *Report on the Assessment of US and Coalition Plans to Train, Equip, and Field the Afghan National Security Forces*, (September 2009), 30, http://www.dodig.mil/spo/Reports/SPO2009-007_final.pdf (accessed September 25, 2010). Other CSS units have been retrained as combat units in order to meet manning requirements.

¹⁰ GAO Report, *Afghanistan Security: Afghan Army Growing, but Additional Trainers Needed, long Term Costs Not Determined*, GAO-11-66, (January 2011), 4, <http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-66>, (accessed February 15, 2011).

Examining the available information on Afghan logistics units and understanding the concepts of military sustainment and culture leads to some significant observations. First, the MoD policy has essentially decreed a logistical system based on a U.S. systemic model and its associated doctrine though the nation currently does not have the economic and industrial base to support such a system. Second, given that doctrine typically reflects the culture of its adherents, U.S. doctrine is almost certain to clash with Afghan culture. Third, Afghanistan's tactical-level logistics units resemble U.S. Army of Excellence (AOE) support battalions that have successfully supported operations in Afghanistan. The U.S. designed the AOE in the post-Vietnam era between 1973 and the mid-1980s to fight and win a war against the Soviet Union in Europe. It represented the U.S.'s unique capability to project overwhelming force and sustainment from the continental U.S. to fight and win globally and was proven in battle in Iraq in 1990 and 2003. The familiarity that U.S. and NATO trainers have with this organization aids adapting this force structure and doctrine for use by the ANA. The U.S. no longer uses the AOE structure, but instead has reorganized its forces into modular elements that can be more easily task organized into larger or smaller units for expeditionary operations. However, since ANA does not require expeditionary capability beyond its borders, the AOE is a more appropriate model for this force. Finally, ANA logistics organizations require the capacity to support the force within the borders of Afghanistan.¹¹ That NTM-A training efforts are now focused on logistics units which are essential to sustaining the ANA is a positive turn in an advisory mission that has lasted nine years. However, the development of ANA sustainment systems, organizations, and doctrine over the next three years must account for the particulars of Afghan culture if it is to last into the post coalition era.

¹¹ LTC Lori Strode (USA), MAJ Mike McPherson (USAF) and MAJ Patrick Holland (USAF) "Task Force Phoenix ANA Logistics Mentor Handbook," April 2009. The information provides a look into how NATO is training ANA Logistics units. This organization is has since been realigned into NATO International Joint Command. The information in this book is likely to evolve over time. It does provide a snapshot of the ANA logistics system from the Ministry of defense to the tactical logistics organization.

Sustainment Doctrine and Afghan Culture

As described by one senior Afghan officer, the framework of this adopted system “is modeled on NATO, but its contents are still Warsaw Pact,” meaning that the senior Afghan logisticians view sustainment through the lens of Soviet logistics.¹² This statement captures the essence of the challenge facing the U.S. and NATO advisors attempting to implement a western logistical system. While it is problematic to generalize about any culture and then apply those generalizations to specific circumstances, it is also self-evident that local cultural values could directly influence the acceptance and implementation of foreign ideas. In this vein, military doctrine can be described as set of ideas that provide a framework of how to think about applying new or required capabilities to future operations.¹³ Sadly, the U.S. and NATO gave very little consideration to culture in the early development of Afghan sustainment doctrine. In fact, until 2009, contractors translated U.S. logistics doctrine into Pashtun without any consideration for what would work or what the Afghans would accept.¹⁴ Due to similar efforts by previous mentors at the MoD level, Afghans embraced a NATO/ U.S. logistics model. The Afghan MoD also adopted U.S. logistics doctrine in the form of a “demand supported distribution based logistics system.”¹⁵ Demand supported inventory in Western doctrine evolved through careful analysis of

¹² International Crisis Group, “A Force in Fragments: Reconstituting the Afghan National Army,” Asia Report no. 190, (12 May 2012), 6, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/190-a-force-in-fragments-reconstituting-the-afghan-national-army.aspx> (accessed August 11, 2010). Crisis Group Interview, Herat, January 18, 2010. This is a quote from a senior Afghan Officer.

¹³ U.S. Department of the Army, *FM 1, The Army* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office 2005), Figure 4-1. The Acronym DOTMLPF is defined as: doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leader development, personnel, and facilities; is the tool used to investigate, evaluate, and compare future Army capabilities. Put another way, DOTMLPF is the common framework used to conduct a deliberate examination of a particular capability.

¹⁴ COL Wade Sokolosky, “Interview with COL Sokolosky, 2009, 7. <http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cgi-bin/showfile.exe?CISOROOT=p4013coll13&CISOPTR=1603&filename=1606.pdf> (accessed September 22, 2010).

¹⁵ GIROA Ministry of Defense, “Decree 4, Supply,” (2010), iv, 5, <http://ntma.com/documents/other/2010/Decree-4-0-Supply-English.pdf> (accessed September 30, 2010). This Decree establishes the foundation of the supply and requisition system. The decree is a change from previously established policy built on supply point logistics. U.S. doctrine allows the commander to employ supply point of unit distribution as the situation and available transportation permits. Supply point expects the supported unit to

historic consumption and aims to reduce inventory, which reduces overall cost.¹⁶ Distribution refers to “the operational process of synchronizing all elements of the logistics system to deliver the right things at the right time to support the commander.”¹⁷ MoD policy states in very clear terms the necessity of embracing the U.S. characteristics with an eye toward the long-term benefits of integrating with the NATO system that allows access to the NATO supply catalog. Despite the efforts of coalition trainers and the best intentions of the MoD, implementing a western style logistics system in Afghanistan will require more time than the political imperatives allow. U.S. Army doctrine describes sustainment as “the provision of logistics, personnel services, and health services support necessary to maintain operations until mission accomplishment.”¹⁸ Anticipation, responsiveness, and economy are the principles of sustainment that conflict with Afghan cultural values.¹⁹ Unfortunately, the U.S. model and its supporting doctrine have the potential for tension with Afghan culture because a demand-supported distribution based logistical system represents change. Whereas, “Afghan culture defines itself by

pull its sustainment from a specified point. Unit distribution pushes sustainment from the logistics point to the supported unit and is the preferred method in the US Army.

¹⁶ Essentially, army information systems track and record unit requisitions for parts, supplies, and other items. The systems then generate recommended stockage levels based on the number of demands for a given item over 30 days. The system requires a minimum number of requisitions to authorize stocking the item. It also requires a minimum number of requisitions per month to continue stocking that item. The purpose of this is to maintain enough stockage on hand to meet the demand but create an overall reduction of that item in the system. The reduced inventory at each organization reduces overall inventory and ultimately cost.

¹⁷ U.S. Department of the Army, *FM 4-0 Sustainment* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office 2009), 1-5.

¹⁸ *FM 4-0 Sustainment*, Glossary 11.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 1-3,1-4. Anticipation is the ability to foresee events and requirements and initiate necessary actions that most appropriately satisfy a response. It is based on professional judgment resulting from experience, knowledge, education, intelligence, and intuition. Sustainment commanders and staffs visualize future operations and identify appropriate required support. Responsiveness is the ability to meet changing requirements on short notice and to rapidly sustain efforts to meet changing circumstances over time. It is providing the right support in the right place at the right time. Economy means providing sustainment resources in an efficient manner to enable a commander to employ all assets to generate the greatest effect possible. The commander achieves economy through efficient management and discipline by prioritizing and allocating resource.... [staffs] also apply discipline in managing resources minimizing waste and unnecessary stockpiling.

what it has always been, it resists change.”²⁰ Therefore, the imposition of a “western logistics” philosophy could easily fail because of the negative connotations attached to alien ideas that are associated with change.²¹

The challenge lies in the fact that the Soviet Union trained the Afghan Army’s current senior logisticians during their occupation in the 1980s, or these logisticians were mujahedeen; and the current generation being trained now sees the world through their family and tribal lens.²² The Soviet logistical system emphasized large supply stocks, operational level leadership that rigidly controlled priorities, and an efficient transportation system.²³ This legacy of Soviet logistics doctrine, and its attendant “hoarding and centrally dictated priorities,” and the stronger aspects of Afghan culture help illustrate the challenges of installing a Western style logistics doctrine.²⁴ Soviet logistic doctrine resonates with Afghans because it embraces power distance, uncertainty avoidance, and the collective nature of Afghan Culture.

To aid in understanding the difficulties faced in implementing this new doctrine, Geert Hofstede’s book, *Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind* provides a basis for comparing different cultures using the following dimensions: 1) Power Distance, 2) Uncertainty Avoidance, 3) Individualism-Collectivism, and 4) Masculinity-Femininity. Power Distance

²⁰ Richard deVillafranca, “Reconsidering Afghanistan: Time for an Azimuth Check,” *Parameters*, no. 4 (Winter 2008-09), 85.

²¹ MAJ Matthew Reed, et al., “Afghanistan National Army Logistics Concept” (Class Project, FT Lee VA: Army Logistics University, 2010), Slide 20.

²² Sokolosky, 6.

²³ Charles A. Russo Jr., *Soviet Logistics in the Afghanistan War* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, April 1991), 5. “Soviet logistics operations were designed to support the high intensity, European battlefield model where logistics are controlled at the Front and Army levels.” Christopher A. Donnelly. *Red Banner, The Soviet Military System in Peace and War* (Coulsdon, UK: Janes Information Group, 1988), 237. Large stockpiles and an efficient transportation system to delivered supplies to units in the operational area in accordance with rigidly controlled priorities. This rigidity extended below Army level, eliminating opportunity for flexibility or initiative.

²⁴ Strode, 2; Sokolosky,” 6. “The ANSF logistics system, still in the early developmental phase, is vastly different than those utilized by Coalition Forces as it reflects the Afghan culture and lacks many of the traditional tools and resources of developed militaries.”

measures the acceptable degree of inequality in a society. Individualism-Collectivism measures the degree to which people in a society see themselves as individuals versus members of a larger collective element; the terms represent the opposite ends of the spectrum. Uncertainty Avoidance measures how societies “tolerate the ambiguous and unpredictable.” Masculinity-Femininity describes how a society or culture views the roles played by men and women.²⁵ Eshan Entezar’s, *Afghanistan 101* employs Hofstede’s dimensions as a lens to describe and understand Afghan culture, which helps to identify challenges implementing NATO sustainment doctrine in the ANA.²⁶

High power distance dampens the key attributes of anticipation and initiative required in demand-supported distribution based logistics. For example, in the U.S. model, the Brigade Support Operations Officer (SPO) monitors the brigade communications net during a combat operation involving extensive artillery support. Based on this information, the SPO reviews artillery ammunition on hand and coordinates with the ammunition supply point for replenishment. The SPO acts in accordance with his analysis of the situation and conclusions drawn from monitoring the brigade radio net. This vignette demonstrates how initiative in the logistician enables anticipation, flexibility and responsiveness without a single requisition from the supported unit or a directive from the chain of command. Consensus building consumes precious time when troops are in contact and challenges the Afghan acceptance of demand-supported distribution based logistics in three areas. First, Afghans generally do not value or encourage individual initiative.²⁷ Second, authority resides in the person who is stronger willed or

²⁵ Geert Hofstede and Gert Jan Hofstede, *Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind* (Chicago: McGraw Hill, 2005), 165.

²⁶ Eshan Entezar, *Afghanistan 101* (United States of America: Xlibris Corporation, 2007)

²⁷ Entezar, 29. Power distance is how the less powerful members of society accept and expect power to be distributed unequally. PD values inculcated from childhood stress obedience, conformity, and close supervision, authoritarian attitudes where power is paternalistic and resides in the person rather than the rule.

charismatic rather than the technically proficient.²⁸ Third, power distance shapes the future of Afghan logistics through patronage because leaders will promote loyal subordinates over the best-qualified or technically proficient soldier.²⁹ It will take some time to overcome the tradition of patronage to enact a system of merit-based promotions.³⁰ Uncertainty avoidance describes how Afghans cope with uncertainty and ambiguity; it stresses reliance on seniority, theoretical knowledge over practical application, and dependence on expert knowledge. Soviet doctrine did not encourage subordinates to question the priorities as directed by expert knowledge.³¹ Specially trained logisticians tend to serve as assistants to senior officers.³² Afghanistan is a collective culture where respected leaders traditionally build consensus within the group to make decisions; loyalty maintains an individual's status in the workplace and ensures minimal deviation from directives.³³ Afghan logisticians trained now and in the future will struggle to implement basic concepts because the entire value system rewards compliance with the status quo.³⁴ The western perspective of corruption represents another cultural tension to the Afghans.³⁵ Patronage and Payoff is a cultural norm and serves as the "glue that holds the state in one piece; it stems from

²⁸ Ibid., 43.

²⁹ Thomas Barfield. *Afghanistan: a Cultural and Political History* (NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009), 330.

³⁰ *United States Plan*, 7.

³¹ Entezar, 142. Maintaining large stockpiles and depots reinforce dampens uncertainty in the supply system.

³² "A Force in Fragments," 6.

³³ Entezar, *Afghanistan 101*, 145. David Park, "Identifying the Center of Gravity in Afghan Mentoring," *Military Review*; (Mar/Apr 2000), 43.

³⁴ David Prugh, "Uncut: Lessons Learned From Six and a Half Years in Afghanistan," *Small Wars Journal*, April 9, 2010, 4. <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2010/04/uncut-lessons-learned-from-six/> (accessed 10 February, 2010). "My conclusion... and I could be wrong, of course... is that each of these guys knows that conspicuous competence will likely be seen as a threat to the powerful (those of higher rank) and/or a threat to the fortunes of other ambitious peers. Shining too brightly could invite a smack-down from the boss or a back-stab from a peer."

³⁵ "Afghanistan Corruption Concerns U.S. Policy Planners," *VOA News*, November, 17 2009, <http://www.voanews.com/english/news/a-13-2009-11-17-voa42-70423837.html> (accessed February 8, 2010).

the high power distance and reinforces the collective nature of Afghan society.³⁶ Therefore, adjustments to the ANA logistics system must allow for working with local and regional power holders as well as tribal leaders, who can influence and benefit from the opportunities derived from supporting the corps in their respective regions. Although Soviet doctrine represents “alien thought,” it presents less of a challenge to conservative Afghan values. In spite of the challenges, MoD’s stated goal still leans to NATO standards in the implementation of Western logistics. The MoD acknowledges that adoption of a U.S. / NATO-based system places significant challenges on the Afghan senior leaders to adjust from their long history of supply point operations and the requirement for additional effort at the policy levels to implement. U.S. doctrine represents an immense challenge since it demands, that the Afghan logistician wrestle with strong currents of high power distance and the tendency to establish a group consensus.³⁷ While western doctrinal concepts are not culturally insurmountable obstacles; they will require considerable effort on the part of the Afghans to inculcate, specifically the ideas of initiative and flexibility that require individuals to act without specific guidance and deviate from an established plan. U.S. doctrine requires initiative in the logistician to act without instruction or reaching a consensus.³⁸ It also demands that the logistician apply professional judgment based on experience and knowledge to plan and adjust sustainment operations in a dynamic operational environment.³⁹ Training and experience coupled with initiative allows the logistician to act without instructions or guidance. Trust in the distribution system as a whole reduces the desire to maintain large quantities of supplies at the unit or organizations. Doctrine drives the development of the entire sustainment

³⁶ Reed, Slide 7.

³⁷ Entezar, 28. Entezar applies Geert Hofstede’s cultural dimension of power distance to Afghanistan. Power distance is described as “the way less powerful members of the group expect and accept that power will be distributed unequally,” 28. Hofstede and Entezar state Afghanistan is a high PD society.

³⁸ David Park, “Identifying the Center of Gravity in Afghan Mentoring,” *Military Review*, (Mar/Apr 2000): 45.

³⁹ Park. Park discusses the Afghan tendency to reach a consensus during what he refers to as the: Question and Answer Planning Process.” This process stems from the historical requirement of Afghan leaders to build consensus within the collective unit.

system from the national to the tactical level. It provides the “how to think” framework in the logistics system and is essential for continued evolution of a self-sustaining ANA in post-coalition Afghanistan.

The term “Afghan right” exposes one of the significant challenges associated with advising and training the ANA.⁴⁰ U.S. and NATO advisors teach Afghans the U.S. Military Decision Making Process (MDMP).⁴¹ The Afghans modify MDMP to the “Question and Answer Planning Process” employs discourse to reach a group consensus that wastes unit preparation time describes the Afghan practice of MDMP.⁴² NATO trainers must leverage the available training time to educate the ANA commanders and staffs on these products so they can demand it from their subordinates.⁴³ Applying “product focused decision making” to logistics demands training on running estimates, the logistics synchronization matrix, and the concept of support.⁴⁴

Understanding the ANA mission is essential to developing its supporting logistical system and linking that system to the national economic and industrial base. The mission defines

⁴⁰ Ibid., The term is based on a “chauvinistic belief that that the Afghan will never achieve our standards”, so accept whatever results they produce. Robert D. Ramsey III, *Advising Indigenous Forces: American Advisors in Korea, Vietnam, and El Salvador*. (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006), 13. LTG David M. Rodriguez, “Afghan SAMS Briefing”. (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, US Army Command and General Staff College, November 15, 2010), 10.

⁴¹ FM 4-0, B-1. The *military decision making process* is an iterative planning methodology that integrates the activities of the commander, staff, subordinate headquarters, and other partners to understand the situation and mission; develop and compare courses of action; decide on a course of action that best accomplishes the mission; and produce an operation plan or order for execution. The MDMP helps leaders apply thoroughness, clarity, sound judgment, logic, and professional knowledge to understand situations, develop options to solve problems, and reach decisions. It is a process that helps commanders, staffs, and others think critically and creatively while planning.

⁴² Park, 45. Question and Answer Planning Process is how the ANA conducts MDMP.

⁴³ Park, 45.

⁴⁴ Ibid. Park argues letting the Afghans work their way perpetuates the current cultural cycle. Providing the correct vision plants the seed for future growth, COL David Prugh concurs with this point stating the Afghan is likely to apply your advice after you leave in order to protect his organizational image. Being seen taking orders or advice from a subordinate demonstrates weakness. This is unacceptable in a high PD culture. Recommend focusing on these products (running estimates, logistics synch matrix, and concept of support) so the ANA logisticians will possess the essential sustainment planning tools.

the conditions required for the ANA to sustain itself in post coalition Afghanistan.⁴⁵ Currently, NATO is focused on preparing the combat forces in each corps for transition of the security mission. NTM-A is conducting institutional training of the enabler units that will ultimately sustain the combat forces in the field. The logistics units will rely on the economic and industrial base to provide the sustainment they will distribute over the infrastructure between the ring road and outlying regions.⁴⁶

The Current ANA Logistics Structure

The CSTC-A logistics mentor stressed its importance [of the ANA logistics system] by stating, “A logistics system that works is what is going to allow us to be able to go home someday – helping the ANSF to become functional and sustainable.”⁴⁷ Building a self-sustaining ANA for the post coalition era requires a logistical system that is capable of procuring sustenance in the form of rations, water, and fuel as well as materiel manufactured in Afghanistan or from international suppliers. This system must possess the ability to look into the future of regional political trends, internal national currents, and determine long-range requirements in order to equip and prepare the ANA to maintain national security. National security facilitates stability through opportunities created by economic growth. The economic and industrial bases provide the government with the essential revenues to fund the military establishment. The logistical system sustains the force by distributing materiel as requested by ANA forces through a system of storage facilities from the national warehouse to the Kandak Supply Officer and ultimately to the Afghan Soldier.⁴⁸

⁴⁵ Reed, Slide 12. The ANA Mission is to secure the borders and deter external threats; defeat terrorist forces; disband, reintegrate, or imprison illegal armed groups; manage internal security threats and emergencies in cooperation with the Afghan National Police.

⁴⁶ U.S. Department of the Army, *FM 3-07, Stability Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office 2009), 2-12, 3-18.

⁴⁷ *Report on the Assessment*, 27.

⁴⁸ Strode, 30, 33. The basic unit in the Afghan National Army is the Kandak (Battalion), consisting of 600 troops. The Kandak is the equivalent to the U.S. Army Battalion in both size and mission. There are

MoD Decree Number 4, Supply establishes the policies and procedures for logistical support within the ANA; efforts at MoD level link the ANA to the national industrial base.⁴⁹ Materiel procured at this level is stored in Logistics Command depots throughout the country. Each depot possesses regional acquisition capability for subsistence and bulk fuel.⁵⁰ The tactical logistics units distribute supplies and personnel between the depots and the units fighting insurgents in the forward areas. NTM-A modeled the ANA logistics structure, specifically the tactical logistics organizations, on the U.S. Army of Excellence. The structural similarity between the U.S. and the ANA logistics units is intentional and copies an organization that successfully sustained forces in the Gulf War, Iraq, and Afghanistan between 1991 and 2004.⁵¹ The essential task for the ANA logistics system is the projection of sustainment from the national economic and industrial base through the national level supply system to the tactical unit fighting insurgents in the remote regions. While self-sustaining logistical capacity is not a requirement of transition of the security mission itself to the ANA, it does facilitate NATO withdrawal because it is an essential condition for the ultimate success of the post coalition ANA.

At the national level, the MoD coordinates with the industrial base to procure material for the ANSF.⁵² Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (AT&L) is the MoD office responsible for integrating strategy and requirements to procure the equipment and weapons for the ANA; it serves as the link to the industrial base. AT&L creates and equips the national sustaining base,

typically 6-8 Kandaks in an ANA Brigade. The number of Kandaks varies between BDE's based on military function and unique mission requirements. Although the vast majority is infantry, at least one mechanized and one tank Battalion has been formed. Every ANA Corps has been assigned a Commando Battalion who will have advanced Infantry training and U.S. equipment. Kabul area units have very specific missions and their organizational structure reflects their unique make up. The most common type of Kandak (Infantry) is listed below along with their current mentor manning requirements.

⁴⁹ "Decree 4, Supply," iv; Strode, 43

⁵⁰ Strode, 43-45.

⁵¹ Prugh, 5.

⁵² Prugh, 2. This includes Afghan National Police Border Patrol, Afghan Uniformed Police, and other specified forces. The ANA logistics system will support the ANP until its organic logistical system develops the necessary capacity..

develops plans to obtain major weapons systems, and manages the acquisition of Combat Support (CS) and Combat Service Support (CSS) systems. AT&L is also responsible for the Acquisition Agency that provides contracting and regional purchase support in the corps area. The Logistics Command operates the national level central supply depots, maintenance, and transportation support functions that receive stores and issues supplies, repairs equipment, and transports supplies throughout the country.⁵³ Figure one provides a layout of the MoD and ANA logistics hierarchies.




Figure 1: Current ANA Logistics Structure⁵⁴

The ANA Chief of the Logistics (General Staff G4) is responsible for managing the ANA's strategic, operational, and tactical needs through management of logistical activities,

⁵³ "Decree Number 4, Supply," iv, 10, 14.

⁵⁴ Strode, 16.

standardizing policy processes, materiel readiness, and logistics training. The corps formation is the essential element of the ANA. The operational level supply system maintains Forward Support Depots (FSD) in four of the corps areas, purchases fuel locally, manages stores of ammunition and general supplies, controls acquisition agents who purchase rations and other items, and provides vehicle maintenance support.⁵⁵ The FSD distributes materiel between the national level and each corps area for use by troops in the field. ANA tactical logistics starts with the Corps Logistics Officer, who is the senior logistician and serves as the corps commander's sustainment expert.⁵⁶ The Corps Logistics Officer coordinates with the Brigade and Kandak logistics officers to sustain the corps. Three organizations, the Corps Support Battalion (CSB), the Corps Service Support Kandak (CSSK), and the Garrison Support Unit (GSU) support the ANA corps.⁵⁷ Figure 2 shows where these organizations fit into an ANA corps. The CSBs bridge the gap between operational and tactical logistics by distributing supplies between the FSD and the ANA corps units, are equipped with signal, supply, maintenance, and medical capability, and provide support to the corps enabler units.⁵⁸ CSBs replenish the Combat Service Support Kandaks (CSSK) that provides direct support to a single ANA brigade. The CSSK provides logistical support to the brigade through its organic supply, distribution, medical, and signal

⁵⁵ "Decree 4, Supply," 47.

⁵⁶ Strode, 49.

⁵⁷ Obaid Younossi, Peter Dahl Thruelsen, Jonathan Vaccaro, Jerry M. Sollinger, Brain Grady, *The Long March, Building an Afghan National Army* (Rand Corporation, National Defense Institute, 2009) , 47. This number already undergoing change based on changes to the overall force structure. Changes to logistics units are driven by the needs of the supported unit population and mission requirements. The rule of thumb is each brigade is authorized a CSSK and the ANA Corps of division is authorized a CSB. These numbers are supported by chart on page 45 in GAO Report Afghan Security, 11-66.

⁵⁸ Strode, 21-24, 28. "The CSB provides a key logistics link to above Brigade units in the Corps area and Brigade CSSKs. It is comprised of the following eight functions: transportation, supply, maintenance, medical, food service, personal administration, communication, and security. The CSB is designed to have a Forward Support Team (FST) capable of deploying forward providing automotive, engineering, and artillery maintenance in addition to medical support identical to the CSSK medical company. Additionally, The CSB is structured to lift two Kandaks simultaneously, lift one infantry company inside armor protected vehicles (7-ton Medium Tactical Vehicle), and provide organic maintenance capabilities for corps assigned vehicles, weapons and communications equipment." NTM-A is building six CSBs, this assertion is based on the number of ANA Corps and the Kabul Division.

capabilities.⁵⁹ NTM-A planners modeled ANA tactical logistics units on the U.S. Army of Excellence (AOE) logistic structure that proved itself in battle during Operation Enduring Freedom.⁶⁰ Tactical level logistics require the capability to project sustainment from the FSD through the corps to the ANA Soldier fighting insurgents in the remote areas. Garrison Support Units (GSU) support units operate the brigade facilities. They provide medical, facilities engineering, communications, and maintenance support.⁶¹ Planners also assume the ANA will not employ more than one corps in a region.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 21-24, 31. “The CSSK in the ANA provides the essential capabilities, functions, activities, and tasks necessary to sustain all elements of operating Forces at the tactical level. Service Support encompasses those activities at all levels of war that produce sustainment to all operating Forces on the battlefield. The mission of the CSSK includes, but is not limited to, support rendered by their soldiers. They ensure that all aspects of supply, maintenance, transportation, and other services required by ground combat troops are handled; allowing those units to accomplish their missions in combat. In the ANA structure, most CSSKs run a Brigade level warehousing function and are an integral piece of the MoD 14 and MoD 9 Processes for requesting and receiving supplies and equipment (See Chapter 6, pg 83 for detailed description of MoD 14 process). CSSKs usually have a maintenance facility where routine maintenance and medium level vehicle repairs can be conducted.” Each Brigade is authorized a CCSK for a planned total of twenty two CSSKs.

⁶⁰ Prugh, 5. “The logistics system here is based quite obviously on the US Army’s logistics system. I know this *NOT* from inference but because I was here when the ANA units were designed. I wasn’t the guy designing the log part, but I knew him. And he did what seemed most logical to him at the time – he designed the organic tactical-level logistics units after our Forward Support Battalions. It seemed to make sense at the time because, well, that’s pretty much the way the rest of the ANA was designed back then – after the US Army’s design.”

⁶¹ *Afghanistan Security*, 45; Strode, 31. There are 23-planned GSU. “Garrison Support Units (GSUs) The ANA GSUs are responsible for installation and life support operations for the Combat Brigade it is assigned to. GSUs are not combat oriented but do focus on supporting combat units. Units that fall under the GSUs are the Personnel, Plans and Operations, Supply, Communications, Medical, Engineering, and other staff offices.”

Current policy directs completion of the transition of security operations from coalition forces to the ANA by 2014. Afghans understand the U.S. cannot sustain its current levels of support indefinitely, therefore, Afghans believe implementing real change to satisfy American policy requirements for the next few years is insignificant compared to the real requirement to build sustainment stocks while the opportunity and money is on hand.⁶⁷ The current system is over centralized. The specified logistical structure itself clashes with Afghan culture and creates unintended obstacles. The corps does not control the key logistics assets, the centralized supply structure, the top-heavy logistics organization with complex command and control, or a support structure designed for fixed garrison operations.⁶⁸ The current structure maintains national level and forward support depots under the Logistic Command subordinate to the MoD. The implication of this is that corps commanders and their subordinate support elements do not control the key logistics assets. The support kandaks at the corps and brigade level maintain limited warehousing capability. Aside from what supplies are on hand in the CSBs and CSSKs, the corps relies on the Forward Logistics Command for all sustainment since the command owns the Forward Support Depot supporting the corps.⁶⁹ Second, the centralized supply structure and top-heavy command and control system reinforce strong Afghan tendencies to delay release of materiel. While it is dangerous to compare Iraq to Afghanistan, the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) describes how Iraqi units view supplies as national treasure. Iraq and Afghanistan are both high power distance cultures where the commander makes all the decisions and which discourage the initiative required by western doctrine.⁷⁰ The ANA employs a relatively

⁶⁷ deVillafranca, 87. This article addresses the view that Afghans resist alien ideas. The reference to hoarding in preparation for the NATO withdrawal is based on anecdotal conversations with former ANA logistics advisors.

⁶⁸ Reed, Slide 32.

⁶⁹ Strobe, 31.

⁷⁰ Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), "Partnership: Development of Logistics Capabilities," *Handbook*, NO 10-08, NOV 09 (Fort Leavenworth: Combined Arms Center), 91; Prugh, 5.

simple requisition process intended to instill responsibility, stewardship, and accountability.⁷¹ Supply requisitions flow from the tactical unit through the logistical system until either the supporting CSSK or the supporting depots can fill it. However, the stronger elements of Afghan culture demand a commander's approval at every level. The result is a delaying loop that forces command and coalition intervention to prevent logistical failure and reduces trust in the system.⁷² Attempting to trust in the logistical system creates tension because logistics failure destroys confidence in the entire system. The collective aspect of Afghan culture relies on the clan and tribe for essential security and support.⁷³ From a rural perspective, collective identity undermines everything considered "national" which by definition includes the ANA and its supporting logistical structure. This attitude is a significant impediment.⁷⁴ Garrison Support Units operate brigade and corps garrisons throughout the country, and reduce corps and brigade commander's workload by maintaining the garrison, operating a Troop Medical Clinic, and personnel services.⁷⁵ Foreign contractors perform GSU functions at the larger logistics facilities.⁷⁶ Garrison functions place additional requirements on the ANA to man, train, equip, and manage tasks that could be performed by trained Afghan civilians and allow logistics soldiers to fill tactical and corps level logistic units. The Afghan economy is still in the early stages of development and is not capable of independently sustaining the ANA.⁷⁷

⁷¹ Strode, 82-86; LTG William B. Caldwell, "Commander's Vision for 2011- Accelerating Progress" NTM-A Webpage, 2, <http://www.ntm-a.com/documents/Commander%27s%20Vision%20for%202011%20-%20Accelerating%20Progress.pdf> (accessed February 15, 2011). This process is diagrammed in the LOG mentors handbook and can also be found in the GIRoA Decree #4 Supply.

⁷² "Decree 4, Supply," v; Sokolosky, 8; Peter Senge. *The Fifth Discipline. Revised Edition* (New York: Currency Books, 2005), 91.

⁷³ Entezar, 73.

⁷⁴ Reed, Slide 20.

⁷⁵ Strode, 33.

⁷⁶ Sokolosky, 3.

⁷⁷ *Afghanistan Security*, 30-34. "DOD and NATO have not completed an analysis of how much funding will be needed to pay for ANA sustainment beyond 2011. Such analysis is important given that, as of January 2010, the International Monetary Fund projected that it will take at least until 2023 for the Afghan government to raise sufficient revenues to cover its operating expenses, including those related to

The Theater Logistics Study Program (TLog) within the U.S. Army Logistics Management University examined the problem of how to link the Afghan logistics system to the industrial base.⁷⁸ Planning guidance instructed a team of multinational logisticians, led by Major Matthew Reed, “to start from a fresh perspective, research international points of view, and analyze what the information means to logistics,” and to “develop a logistics structure and concept for a post coalition Afghan Army.”⁷⁹

The team reframed the problem from “change the Afghans to meet our system” to “change the system to meet the Afghans.”⁸⁰ The following points, shown in Figure 3, describe some of the elements of Afghan culture that must be understood in order to change the system to meet the Afghans: 1) reliance on information automation systems is not likely to last long after coalition departure; 2) Afghans tend to reject alien ideas; 3) culture shapes choices, and 4) account for corruption and patronage in the recommended system.⁸¹ These points argue against installing a western style logistical system and binding of requirements of the logistical system to

the army—thereby highlighting Afghanistan’s continued dependence on external sources of funding. In addition, DOD and NATO studies indicate that growth of the ANA beyond the current end goal of 171,600 may be necessary, which will require additional funding beyond what the United States and international community have already provided.” GAO also states the ANA has increased its funding from \$250 to \$290 million dollars. This represents a full fifth of the national revenue of \$1.5 billion. The U.S. has paid over \$650 million since 2007 and has increased to \$1.9 billion in 2010.

⁷⁸ LTG Mitchell H. Stevenson, “TLog, Preparing Army Logisticians for the Modular Force,” *Army Logistician*, PB 700-07-06, Volume 39, Issue 6, http://www.almc.army.mil/alog/issues/NovDec07/tlog_modforce.html (accessed 19 September 2010). TLog is a course within the U.S. Army Logistics Management University. The program is designed to “develop agile, innovative logisticians who have the decision, analysis, logistics knowledge, and skill sets to find solutions to complex operational logistics challenges.” TLog uses the instructional model followed by the School of Advanced Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The course teaches students to apply conceptual planning techniques to logistical problems. LTG Stevenson believes this course provides its graduates the planners to skills to successfully plan logistics in the Army’s higher sustainment echelons. MAJ Matthew Reed’s team of multinational team composed of American, European, and Middle Eastern field grade logicians, provided diverse points of view and logistical expertise. The team conducted a detailed examination of the Afghanistan through the operational variables of Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, Infrastructure, Physical Environment, and Time (PMESII-PT). FM 3-0 defines the operational variables in greater detail. The team visualized how these variables affected Afghan logistics

⁷⁹ Reed, Slide 4.

⁸⁰ Ibid., Slide 7.

⁸¹ Ibid.

the developing national industrial base. They also recommend embracing the stronger aspects of Afghan culture while it builds combat forces and actively fights an insurgency. A regionally anchored system restructured to reduce inefficiency, and the adoption of a garrison management system similar to the U.S. Installation Management Command (IMCOM), set favorable conditions for the logistical system to continue sustaining the ANA after the departure of coalition forces.




Figure 3: Reframing the Problem⁸².

Based on these considerations, TLog correctly identifies methods to change the system to meet the Afghans. The ANA needs a logistical system centered on each region that can support mostly light infantry forces on operations over long distances from the ring road.⁸³ This system must support the ANA and foster growth in the local and regional economies in terms of jobs and improved economic opportunity that ultimately strengthens ties with the local population. Each

⁸² Reed, Slide 7.

⁸³ Ibid. Slide 12.

corps region can adopt a mix of local purchase and fabrication, augmenting the local depot capability to maintain stockage objectives through known and anticipated delays. An example of this would be to purchase rations locally until weather closes supply routes in the higher altitudes. Therefore, corps regions must work with the logistics leadership at the national level to build up required balances to sustain the corps through the extreme weather season. The regional system is an updated version of the GNA salvage depots and embraces Afghan culture by placing the onus of stewardship on the corps commander. High power distance establishes power in the person of the strong leader and embraces the high power distance nature by placing his means of sustainment directly under his control. In this way, regional anchoring furthers government influence through patronage and payoff.⁸⁴ This makes the commander different from a warlord because the commander embodies the power of the state in the region. While there is a concern of the corps commander building personal wealth and power, President Karzai exerts control through the Afghan tradition of patronage and payoff.⁸⁵

According to the economic base theory, regional ANA logistics can be the economic engine that creates growth and employment opportunities in the corps areas.⁸⁶ Little to no change in the rural villages best represents the current state of the Afghan economy.⁸⁷ Rural villages generally operate on a subsistence basis, and maintain local order using traditional methods to reach a workable consensus. This local stability explains why 39 years of war did not destroy Afghanistan and represents the greatest obstacle to meaningful change.⁸⁸ Currently, procurement of local surpluses sustains the corps in each region. However, procurement must be carefully distributed throughout the corps area to avoid adversely influencing the local economies. Furthermore, planners must carefully study local procurement to generate and maintain the

⁸⁴ Entezar, Slide 36.

⁸⁵ Barfield, 271.

⁸⁶ Reed, Slide 17.

⁸⁷ deVillafranca, 88.

⁸⁸ Barfield, 35.

desired effects.⁸⁹ Planning must also account for projected losses to pilferage and theft that is a common problem despite Islamic teachings.⁹⁰

Removing excess structural bureaucracy at the strategic and operational levels in the ANA Logistics Command will strengthen regionally focused logistics and speed the requisition process. NTM-A and the Afghan MoD must merge the strategic level or national subsistence, fuel, ammunition, and medical supply warehouses with the original Afghan logistics depots numbered Zero, One, and Two located in and around Kabul. Next, the Afghan MoD and NTM-A must eliminate the Forward Support Groups that operate the regional depots under the Logistics Command that operate the regional depots. The following organizations should be established and placed under the direct command and control the Corps Support Battalion: A depot and distribution company to receive, store, issue, and distribute supplies throughout the corps area and an acquisition company to procure supplies and services within the region. A mobile forward support detachment to provide command and control of corps sustainment units providing direct support to tactical units in addition to the existing supply, maintenance, medical and supply, and distribution units.⁹¹ These changes are shown in Figure 4. These changes would place the responsibility of stewardship on the corps commander and provide the best means of support by leveraging the national supply base and regional vendors. This recommendation will embrace Afghan culture by removing a layer of command between the national supply base and the corps commander and the Forward Support Command.⁹² Furthermore, this would expand the power distance and collective relationship under the commander and will bridge the gap between U.S. and Soviet logistic doctrine by placing a depot within reach. This adjustment will also mitigate the element of uncertainty and will alleviate the belief that “supplies are viewed as “national

⁸⁹ Reed, Slide 17.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Reed, Slide 36, 35.

⁹² Sokolosky, 8.

wealth.”⁹³ We can generalize the similarities between Iraqis and Afghans due to the remnants of the Soviet system and the influence of high power distance decision making. Afghans, Arab countries, and Russia are all high power distance cultures. The lingering effects of the Soviet system and high power distance that cause the “delaying loop” by requiring command intervention drive the necessity for reorganizing the system around the corps commander.

Recommended Structure




Figure 4: Recommended Logistics Command and Control Structure⁹⁴

Finally, NTM-A must help the Afghans implement an Installation Management Command garrison structure in order to provide additional regional employment. Afghans must contract with Afghans to perform the garrison support tasks.⁹⁵ Garrison management, maintenance on facilities, light fabrication, food service, and laundry service are trades that can

⁹³ CALL, 91.

⁹⁴ Reed, Slide 35.

⁹⁵ Ibid., Slide 25.

be transitioned to Afghan civilians with careful planning and training. These tasks ensure the garrison facilities will be maintained and secured while the corps is engaged in the fight. Further, they are all beholden to the corps commander who embodies both the state and economic opportunity. This recommendation embraces Afghan culture in that it addresses the corps commander as the power figure for the ANA in a region. The commander helps the national government maintain stability in the region as a source of employment, procurement, and real opportunity.

The challenges inherent in these changes are represented by fear of creating competitors to Kabul, pilferage, and stress on the regional economy. These challenges are mitigated by the fact that Afghanistan did not Balkanize despite over 30 years of civil war, and because Afghans recognize and follow strong leaders while specific tribes maintain the authority to govern.⁹⁶ Regional authority of the corps commander can mitigate pilferage and corruption, and planning for pilferage ensures supplies are available. The main mitigating factor is the authority of the corps commander because power distance dictates the person is the focal point of authority, therefore, logisticians are less likely to act without direction from the commander. The regional system could dampen pilferage within the corps. Finally, the corps acquisition company must balance its effort to purchase surpluses without stressing the local economic balance. Afghans tend to be shrewd merchants and are likely to strengthen the local economy.

The U.S. and NATO can build a logistical system that embraces Afghan culture and links the developing national industrial base while the forces is actively fighting an insurgency. The model developed by the TLOG team can successfully fuse these varied and critical requirements.

⁹⁶ Barfield, 4, 278, 338. Barfield argues that Afghanistan did not “Balkanize” because the “swiss cheese” approach of proclaiming government control but recognizing that total control was neither possible nor desirable. Afghan history shows the long lasting dynasties did not attempt to force change in the conservative rural areas. Barfield argues four points against Balkanizing Afghanistan. 1) Afghans do not link ethnicity with nationalism; 2) Each ethnic group felt secure enough in its own region to cooperate with the other at the national level; 3) negative consequences of disunion outweighed political factors; 4) Afghans had few illusions about state politics and the compromises necessary to engage in them.

Their recommendations provide a culturally palatable method to link national base to the tactical logistics system through mission analysis and the inherent challenges.

NATO Command and Control of Training Efforts

Efforts to build the ANA have been underway since 2002 and have increased in complexity as the mission expanded in scope. In 2009, ISAF reorganized the coalition training mission in Afghanistan to improve unity of command and effort of advisory operations.⁹⁷ The reorganization clarified lines of responsibility, improved partnership between coalition forces and the ANA, and assigned ownership of terrain. Ownership of terrain is critical during situations where ANA units and their advisors are in contact with insurgent forces.⁹⁸ The ISAF Joint Command (IJC) and NATO Training Mission Afghanistan (NTM-A) are responsible for building the ANA. IJC is responsible for daily command of NATO units as well as training units ANA in the field⁹⁹ while NTM-A supervises ANA institutional training and assists the MoD with generating forces.¹⁰⁰

Coalition and NATO forces are working together under the “*shoanna-ba-shoanna*” or “shoulder to shoulder” policy.¹⁰¹ The U.S. builds ANA capacity through partnership with U.S.

⁹⁷ *Afghanistan Security*, 5.

⁹⁸ Wayne W. Grigsby Jr., David W. Pendall, and Ed Ledford, “The Combined Team: Partnered Operations in Afghanistan,” *Small Wars Journal* Blog, article posted May 25, 2010, 3, <http://smallwarsjournal.Com/blog/2010/05/> (accessed January 15, 2010).

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 3. “Daily coalition operations, integrates ISAF efforts... and brings all battle space owners under a single operational commander.”

¹⁰⁰ NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan website, <http://www.isaf.nato.int/subordinate-commands/nato-training-mission-afghanistan/index.php#Mission> (accessed February 10, 2011); NTM-A website, <http://www.nato.int/isaf/topics/factsheets/NTM-A-background.pdf> (accessed 3 December 2010). NATO Backgrounder file provides additional information on the genesis of NTM-A. “NATO Training Mission Afghanistan (NTM-A) in coordination with NATO nations and partners, international organizations, donors and non-governmental organizations, supports the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in generating and sustaining the ANSF, develops leaders, and establishes enduring institutional capacity to enable accountable, Afghan-led security.

¹⁰¹ Tom Simmons, “Training Afghans ‘Shohna ba Shohna,’ ‘Shoulder to Shoulder,’” NATO Training Mission Afghanistan, Website, <http://www.ntm-a.com/news/categories/army/1974-training-afghans-shohna-ba-shohna-shoulder-to-shoulder?lang=> (accessed February 15, 2011).

Army Advise and Assist Brigades (AAB) who are subordinate to the IJC.¹⁰² U.S. advisors allow the Afghans to work through their challenges intervening only to prevent mission failure.¹⁰³

The IJC changed its assessment system for evaluating ANA units in April 2010.¹⁰⁴ The change presented in Figure 5 is intended to reduce the overly quantitative nature of the previous evaluation system.¹⁰⁵ The 205th Corps is leading operations in its area of responsibility.¹⁰⁶ Its CSS Kandak is nearing the capacity to work “effectively with advisors.”¹⁰⁷

Depending on the situation, units may require assistance from the international planners.¹⁰⁸ This is an important milestone because it provides the Afghans and their trainers with a proof of principle, or a success story, that is vital to change management.

Table 3: Rating Definition Levels for Assessing ANA Capability	
Rating definition level	Description
Independent	Unit is capable of planning, executing, and sustaining the full spectrum of its missions without assistance from coalition forces.
Effective with advisors	Unit is capable of planning, executing, and sustaining independent operations within their own battle space and maintaining regional security with limited guidance from training team only. Partnered unit assistance is no longer needed.
Effective with assistance	Unit is capable of planning, executing, and sustaining independent operations and maintaining regional security with limited assistance from partnered unit.
Dependent on coalition forces for success	Unit capability is dependent on partnered unit presence/assistance to execute and sustain operations and maintain regional security.
Ineffective	Unit is not capable of executing or sustaining operations even with partnered unit presence/assistance.

Source: NATO.

Figure 5: IJC Rating Definition Levels for Assessing ANA Capacity.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰² Grigsby, 10.

¹⁰³ Strode, 57. Intervention is dependent on the importance of the mission underway.

¹⁰⁴ *Afghanistan Security*, 21.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁶ William Selby, “US Advisor Praises Progress of Afghan Army’s 205th Corps,” American Forces Press Service, <http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=52167> (accessed February 27, 2011).

¹⁰⁷ Thomas M. Hammond, “ANA Combat Service Support Kandak Reaches New Milestone,” Task Force 3-09 Webpage, (May 2010), http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/lfwa/tf309/feature_ssKandak_milestone.asp (accessed December 21, 2010).

¹⁰⁸ *United States Plan*, 7.

¹⁰⁹ *Afghanistan Security*, 21.

The Afghan National Development Strategy

The ANA logistical system requires a stable national economic and industrial base to provide essential material and funding for its facilities throughout the country. Afghanistan developed a comprehensive strategy in 2008 to build the capabilities required to sustain the ANA. The Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS) introduced the economic and industrial base, connected these bases to ANA sustainment, and briefly reviewed the long-term economic growth in other nations to emphasize the importance of the base to supporting the ANA.

The ANDS lays out the strategic priorities and policies, programs and projects for achieving the Afghan Government's developmental objectives, and represents an Afghan face on a holistic approach to addressing the challenges of developing a stable economic and industrial base. The strategy addresses Afghan economic and social goals between 2008 and 2013 as part of a comprehensive and integrated assessment of the entire nation. The purpose of the strategy is to establish policy measures to support these goals.¹¹⁰ Complementing the ANDS is the United States Government Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan that provides strategic guidance to U.S. forces and agencies in Afghanistan.¹¹¹ The plan recognizes that a strategic approach must coordinate national efforts to the regional level and simultaneously allow for flexibility in the provinces and districts to establish local priorities. The U.S. Campaign plan attempts to synchronize U.S. Government efforts and opportunities with the full range of U.S., Afghan Government, NATO, and International Community (IC) agencies working to rebuild

¹¹⁰ Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, "Afghanistan National Development Strategy, 2008-2013," 5, http://www.undp.org.af/publications/KeyDocuments/ANDS_Full_Eng.pdf (accessed February 8, 2011). To reduce poverty, build a stable country and expand the economy, the people, government and international community developed the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS) These are organized under three pillars: (i) Security; (ii) Governance, Rule of Law and Human Rights; and (iii) Economic and Social Development. ANDS states the strategic objective for economic and social development are to enable the private sector to lead Afghanistan's development within a competitive market-based economy in which the Government is the policy maker and regulator of the economy, not its competitor.

¹¹¹ Embassy of the United States Kabul and United States Forces, Afghanistan, "United States Government Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan, Revision 1," (March 1, 2011), i. The plan intends to increase economic opportunity through licit agricultural production, private sector development, improved security and cross border trade.

Afghanistan. Further, it addresses essential requirements to develop an economic base built on private sector business, international trade, and agricultural development that generate revenues required to sustain the military logistics system.¹¹²

Economic Base Theory asserts that the means of strengthening and growing the local economy is developing and enhancing the basic sector, or the “engine.”¹¹³ The economic base is composed of Basic and Non-Basic sectors.¹¹⁴ Basic Sector businesses depend on external factors and markets. Some examples in Afghanistan are opium, pomegranates, transnational commerce, and mineral extraction. Non-Basic Sectors are businesses that depend largely on local conditions. Afghan examples are contract support for coalition forces, security, and local subsistence enterprises. Base theory describes the development of economic sectors that are external to the local as successful method of building a stronger economy.¹¹⁵ A wide economic base provides employment, growth, and opportunities that lead to stability. In the case of Afghanistan, the desire is to have an economic base that generates the revenues for the government to acquire manufactured items for use by the ANA.¹¹⁶ This includes production and maintenance bases in the private and state owned sectors.

Building the Economic and Industrial Base in Afghanistan

Building a stable base is a long-term process and requires a driving imperative. The current U.S. military industrial base developed after World War II and was driven by a half-

¹¹² “U.S. Civil Military Campaign Plan”, 1. This document supports the increased attention a holistic solution to a complex problem. The initial plan published in 2009 is adjusted to support ANDS. It also recognizes the U.S. cannot direct efforts of ISAF forces, non U.S. PRTS or other donors.

¹¹³ Timothy Chapin; <http://mailer.fsu.edu/~tchapin/garnet-tchapin/urp5261/topics/econbase.htm> (accessed February 8, 2011).

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ *FM 4-0*, 2-4. “The industrial base consists of privately owned and government-owned industrial capability and capacity for manufacture, maintenance; modification, overhaul, and/or repair of items required by the U.S. and selected allies. It includes the production base and maintenance base. Active plants and production lines have some capability to surge. Repair parts manufacturers may be able to surge production for items that sustain deployed weapon systems. National policy requires the use of commercial materiel as much as possible.”

century competition with the Soviet Union. Japan recovered from postwar devastation in 1945 to become a major economic power inside of 40 years. The Republic of Korea transitioned from an agrarian economy and post war devastation in 1953 to its world-class status within 50 years. Greece's economic miracle started in 1949 and grew spectacularly in the 1950s. Building stable economic and industrial foundations requires patience. These nations relied on extensive foreign aid, mostly American, to rebuild their nations and economies. By comparison, the NATO mission has been underway since 2002 with little effect on economic growth and large-scale involvement and investment by western nations is questionable after 2014.

“Afghans First” is a current NATO initiative intended to stimulate economic growth in Afghanistan by “spending in Afghanistan” through rapid development of Afghan industry in the available time.¹¹⁷ Under this program, ISAF sponsors Afghan projects intended to build the defense industrial base through light industry. Construction projects, contracting efforts, mining ventures, and international commerce represent potential revenue streams for the Afghan government and employment opportunities that lead toward stability and help sustain the ANA. Afghanistan lacks a strong economic base and relies on military aid and limited industry.¹¹⁸ Until the Afghans develop the capability to provide security for international commerce and extract their existing natural resources, they are forced to rely on foreign aid to sustain their armed forces. If they can establish the conditions for commerce and resource 's extraction, then Afghanistan's estimated wealth could be converted to manufacturing capacity or direct purchase of top end equipment. Other nations have successfully modified their economies from agrarian based to manufacturing-based, even to the point of building sophisticated weapons systems such

¹¹⁷ International Security and Assistance Force, “NATO Afghan First Policy,” ISAF Website, <http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/stories/File/factsheets/april/Afghan%20First%20Policy%20Apr%202010.pdf> (accessed February 9, 2011). Initiated in 2009, the program aims to “reorient resources towards the Afghan private sector, NATO and ISAF Troop Contributing Nations can help create jobs, build economic capacities, encourage the development of infrastructure and generate tax revenue to support the delivery of services to the people of Afghanistan.”

¹¹⁸ Barfield, 315.

as fighters, tanks, and naval vessels after years of purchasing these systems abroad. For example, the Republic of Korea completely transformed its economy from an agrarian-based to a globally recognized industrial power between 1953 and 1980s, facilitated in large part by the security provided by the American-trained ROK Army and American economic aid. The current estimated ROK gross domestic product (GDP) is over \$1 trillion.¹¹⁹ Given similar efforts to create reliable governmental institutions, internal security, and foreign investment, Afghanistan could follow a similar path development and growth to both build their military capacity and strengthen the nation.

More needs to be done, however, to build a stable economic and industrial base in Afghanistan between now and 2014 if such a base is to be able to provide the Afghan government with revenues for funding the ANA. History provides an example of a successful short-term development effort conducted during a civil war.¹²⁰ The U.S. Advisory Mission to Greece (USMAG) from 1947-1949 helped establish a national economic and industrial base to support the parallel development of indigenous military forces by U.S. military advisors.¹²¹ The case is interesting because it successfully evolved over two short years of effort, a relatively modest investment, and with less than 500 advisors. By contrast, the U.S. has been in Afghanistan for eight years, spent \$56 billion, and increased troop strength to 98,000, although admittedly, efforts in Afghanistan are focused on the creation of industrial and economic capacity while AMAG efforts were focused on the reconstruction and reestablishment of damaged capacity.

Greece and Afghanistan bear striking cultural similarities in terms of social order, dependence on foreign aid, weak central government, and a faltering economy damaged by years of war. Despite Greece's reputation as the origin of western thought, they are culturally similar to

¹¹⁹ CIA World Factbook, website, "South Korea, Economy," <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ks.html> (accessed April 5, 2011).

¹²⁰ MAJ Trajon Mashack, "Developing a Self Sustaining Afghan National Army" (Fort Leavenworth: School of Advanced Military Studies, US Army Command and General Staff College, 2009).

¹²¹ Ibid., 40.

Arab cultures in terms of power distance, individualism and collectivism, and uncertainty avoidance.¹²² These cultural values led to corruption, graft, and paternalistic clan leaders who viewed the central government with suspicion.¹²³ The Greek government relied on foreign aid and was not willing to implement direct taxes as a means to raise desperately needed revenue. Economic policy tended to favor the wealthy and ignore the plight of rural villages.¹²⁴ Market forces had long since degenerated into black marketing. The weakness of the central government discouraged foreign investment and ensured the failure of any long-range plan.¹²⁵

The lessons learned in Greece must be selectively applied due to the current political and economic realities in Afghanistan. The Greeks, British, and American reconstruction planners all recognized that long-term success in Greece, defined as a self-sustaining economy, required emphasis on rebuilding transportation infrastructure and housing, expanding industrial capacity, building hydroelectric power, and expanded agriculture through land reclamation restart the Greek economy was a multiyear process. However, previous attempts to implement a holistic plan failed due to the weakness of the Greek central government and rift between social classes.¹²⁶ The U.S. policy of withholding aid forced Greeks to accept the fact that the economic authority of the government required rehabilitation.¹²⁷ U.S. advisors exerted extraordinary control over the Greek government, its economic policy, and worked to reduce the size and increase the effectiveness of the civil service. This policy eventually extended into the military allowing the

¹²² Hofstede, 49, 79, 83, 124.

¹²³ Howard Jones, *A New Kind of War, America's Global Strategy and the Truman Doctrine Greece* (New York: Oxford, 1989), 64.

¹²⁴ Jones, 28-30.

¹²⁵ Lawrence S. Wittner, *American Intervention In Greece, 1943-1949* (New York, Columbia, 1982), 168-175.

¹²⁶ Stavros B. Thomadakis, "Stabilization, Development and Government Economic Authority in the 1940's," in John O. Iatrides and Linda Wrigley ed. *Greece at the Crossroads, The Civil War and its Legacy*, (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), 178. .

¹²⁷ Wittner, 171.

U.S. to reshuffle senior army leaders.¹²⁸ Eventually, Greek acquiescence to U.S. directives frustrated the advisory effort and arguably stifled Greek initiative and development of free enterprise.¹²⁹ Attempting to exert this level of control in Afghanistan this is not advisable because the U.S. does not desire to control nor can it afford the appearance of controlling the Afghan government and military establishment. Transition and long-term success depend on a strong Afghan government, economic, and physical security. Because the U.S. and NATO raised the current ANA in its entirety vice training and expanding an existing army the Greek military assistance model does not fit the situation. Additionally, U.S. policy did not favor deployment of combat troops to directly engage the Greek insurgents. Economic development efforts attempted increase trade between Greece and the west using donated merchant vessels. The vessels served the intended purpose but the owners registered the vessels under foreign flags and the government received no tax revenues.¹³⁰ The U.S. must encourage Afghanistan to participate in regional trade regardless of political challenges with Iran, Russia, and China.

The initial U.S. aid program emphasized reconstruction, industrial development, hydroelectric power, and land reclamation as a means to bleed support away from the insurgency through economic opportunity.¹³¹ By 1948, the U.S. shifted funding emphasis from reconstruction and industrial expansion to support of military operations to defeat the insurgency. The U.S. and NATO have fought Afghan insurgents for over eight years with limited success. The U.S. must reverse this emphasis in Afghanistan because of the symbiotic relationship between physical and economic security.

Physical and economic security formed a symbiotic relationship that enabled stability in Greece. Physical security provided by the GNA improved as its organic logistical system

¹²⁸ Ibid., 241.

¹²⁹ Ibid., 173.

¹³⁰ Ibid., 176

¹³¹ Bickham Sweet-Escott, *Greece, A Political and Economic Survey* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1954), 105-110.

developed alongside the expanded economic and industrial base. Stability ultimately defeated the Greek insurgency through provision of economic opportunity throughout the country. Therefore, elements of the Greek model can be applied to Afghanistan because stability depends on both economic security and physical security. The post coalition ANA logistical system requires a functioning economic and industrial base in order to sustain physical security operations. Given the projected departure of NATO forces from Afghanistan by 2014, the Greek case is worthy of further examination because the deliberate initial emphasis on reconstruction and industrial capacity set conditions for a rapid expansion of the Greek economy that combined with a limited military advisory mission to defeat the communist insurgency.

The U.S. Advisory Mission to Greece 1947-1949

USMAG aided the development of economic and industrial capacity initially geared to supporting the Greek National Army (GNA) with light materiel while fighting a determined Communist insurgency, and weighted its initial effort toward building economic and industrial capacity by investing over \$600 million in economic and military aid to Greece, along with civilian and military advisors.¹³² Furthermore, the U.S. effort set conditions for long-term economic growth in early 1950's and produced favorable military results in roughly two years.

The withdrawal of German forces from Greece in 1944 provided the Soviet Union with an opportunity to expand its influence into the country through insurgency.¹³³ A small British liberation force attempted to assist the struggling Greek monarchy with security assistance and stability operations. The English force of 26,000 was incapable of anything more than local security in the larger cities, giving the Communist insurgents freedom of action.¹³⁴ The combined

¹³² Frank Abbott, "The Greek Civil War 1947-1949: Lessons for the Operational Artist in Foreign Internal Defense" (Fort Leavenworth: School of Advanced Military Studies, USCGS, 1994), 1.

¹³³ Walter A. McDougall, *Promised Land, Crusader State* (New York, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1997), 159, 184. Soviet expansion through insurgency as a way expand influence and control while avoiding direct conflict that could escalate into general atomic war with the US.

¹³⁴ Mashack, 41.

lack of capacity of the British and Greek forces left the majority of the country open to the Communist supported insurgency. In 1949, the British government withdrew this force in the face of post war financial hardships and the realization it could not counter the insurgency. American involvement in post-World War II Greece started with the withdrawal of British Liberation Forces in February 1949 and grew as the U.S. extended the Marshall Plan investment to rebuild and expand Greek economic and capacity. President Harry Truman authorized \$400 million in aid to Greece and Turkey in May of 1947, in a bid to contain the spread of Communism, keeping it out of Greece and Turkey.¹³⁵ Because of the Greek struggle to rebuild the national economic, industrial, and governmental infrastructure while fighting Communist insurgents, U.S. assistance efforts in Greece expanded along two fronts: economic assistance in the form of infrastructure and industrial reconstruction and military assistance focused on rebuilding troop units and providing advice at the division and higher commands. The essential element of the Greek case is it was established within the framework rebuilding all of Europe. While the general economic principles can be applied to Afghanistan, there is some variance driven by reality. First, construction of military facilities is an essential task for establishing the ANA. These projects must eventually spawn secondary and tertiary businesses. Second, the American Mission for Aid to Greece (AMAG) was able to expand industrial capacity in Greece. “The route to economic restructuring [in Greece] would have to be a drive toward industrialization.”¹³⁶ Creation of new industrial capacity in Afghanistan requires international investment. The military assistance technique is not readily adaptable since the U.S. and NATO had to create and train an army from raw recruits. Regional depots and ANA garrisons are similar to but not quite the same as the GNA salvage depots. Additionally, the regional relationships of Greece and Afghanistan are very different in the sense of contiguous borders and Cold War balance. The AMAG provided the

¹³⁵ Kevin Dougherty, “FAO History: General Van Fleet and JUSMAPG in Greece,” <http://www.faoa.org/journal/vanfleet/html> (accessed November 11, 2009).

¹³⁶ Thomadakis, 189.

necessary financing, means, and materials to contract local businesses to sustain the GNA.¹³⁷ In concert with AMAG efforts, the Joint Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG) under Lieutenant General (Lt Gen) James Van Fleet, composed of 350 advisors, worked to retrain and reorganize the GNA. Lt Gen Van Fleet guided a GNA of 132,000 on paper, categorized as ill equipped, dispersed, and not-too-efficient, into an Army that ultimately defeated the insurgents.¹³⁸ JUSMAG influenced GNA operations at the division and army headquarters, streamlined logistics operations, and linked the GNA to the emerging industrial base. By the end of 1949, the GNA had received an estimated 174,000 tons of supplies. JUSMAG established base salvage depots throughout the country.¹³⁹ These depots improved forward logistical support and emerged as the GNA sustainment system. The ultimate result of the AMAG investment and JUSMAG military assistance was a robust GNA logistics systems built on a stable economic and industrial foundation that restored public confidence in the Greek Government that dampened popular support to the communist insurgents.¹⁴⁰

Applying Greek Lessons to Afghanistan

It is possible to apply some of the successful techniques used in Greece to the current challenge in Afghanistan. However, one size does not fit all, which means we must be selective about what lessons can be applied in Afghanistan. Four important aspects of the Greek experience can be applied to building a self-sustaining ANA. In general terms, the U.S. efforts in Afghanistan must emphasize investment in reconstruction of transportation infrastructure, developing industrial capacity, large scale economic investment, and local innovation developing a military logistics network. The effort in Afghanistan must be conducted regionally and linked to

¹³⁷ US Department of Defense, *USAGG History Volume I*, Box 53, Folder 16 (Lexington, VA: George C. Marshall Research Library), 117.

¹³⁸ Paul Olkhovsky, *The Greek Civil War: The Examination of America's First Cold War Victory* (Alexandria, Virginia, Center for Naval Analyses: Support and Operations Division, 1991), 5.

¹³⁹ Mashack, 43.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 42.

an overall scheme at the national level. Conversely, U.S. efforts in Greece focused its initial investment on reconstruction of transportation infrastructure and expansion of the industrial base, while JUSGMAG innovations emerged into the Greek National Army (GNA) logistical system.

Current investment efforts in Afghanistan are consistent with or exceed the U.S. experience in Greece in terms of U.S. spending, building infrastructure in terms of roads, industrial capacity, and regional investment opportunity. To date the U.S. has invested over \$56.1 billion dollars in Afghan reconstruction projects ranging from building ANA barracks to a village footbridge. These projects used a variety of U.S. funds including the Economic Support Fund (ESF) administered by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).¹⁴¹ Therefore, the U.S. investment dwarfs the \$600 million spent in Greece, which works out to \$5.4 billion in 2009 dollars.¹⁴² The ANSF fund is the largest block of U.S. investment but is committed to building ANSF infrastructure, barracks, and the training and maintenance facilities required for increasing ANA troop strength. The application of these funds toward military facilities rather than toward economic and industrial development is a key difference in the approach taken in Afghanistan. In Greece, the primary recipients of funding were coordinated reconstruction efforts specifically roads, railroads, canals and ports that linked essential economic and industrial infrastructure throughout the country. Investment in Afghan reconstruction efforts and other projects have rarely been coordinated outside of a region or military area of operations. In fact, the coalition did not possess a nationwide holistic plan for systemic reconstruction of Afghanistan until 2008. AMAG investment, on the other hand, pursued a holistic effort that supported

¹⁴¹ Commission on Wartime Contracting, Testimony by Arnold Fields Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction Before the Commission on Wartime Contracting: Hearings on Recurring Problems in Afghan Reconstruction, 111th Congress, 1st Session, 2011, 1.

¹⁴² Lawrence Officer, and Samuel Williamson, "Computing Relative Values of a U.S. Dollar Amount – 1774 to Present," Measuring Worth, http://www.measuringworth.com/uscompare/result.php?use%5B%5D=DOLLAR&use%5B%5D=GDPDEFLATION&use%5B%5D=VCB&use%5B%5D=UNSKILLED&use%5B%5D=MANCOMP&use%5B%5D=NOMGDPCP&use%5B%5D=NOMINALGDP&year_source=1949&amount=6000000000&year_result=2009, (accessed February 25, 2011). This works out to about 5.4 billion dollars in consumer price index, \$31.7 billion in relative share of GDP.

restoration of the Greek economic and industrial bases. In both cases, contractors employed local people for labor and skilled supervisors if available to provide economic opportunity in terms of jobs. U.S Stability Operations doctrine discusses restoration of transportation infrastructure as a subtask of “Support to Economic and Infrastructure Development.”¹⁴³ “Restoring the transportation and distribution capability of the state is central to economic recovery. An underdeveloped or incapacitated transportation infrastructure limits freedom of movement, trade, social interaction, and development.”¹⁴⁴ Regional infrastructure improvements provide opportunity for the outlying regions to market agricultural surpluses. World War II and the subsequent civil war destroyed Greece’s limited transportation infrastructure.¹⁴⁵

Afghan transportation infrastructure has suffered from 30 years of war. However, where U.S. efforts in Greece focused initially on infrastructure tied directly to Greek economic capacity, such as ports, canals, and railroads, coalition forces in Afghanistan tend to build roads and bridges in a haphazard fashion, focused more on quantifiable metrics than a systemic approach.¹⁴⁶ Greek and Afghan road reconstruction efforts are similar. The Greek highway network totaled over 6,000 miles in 1947; the overwhelming scope of this project forced planners in Greece to focus their efforts on the 1,100 miles of road that linked critical economic and military lines of communication.¹⁴⁷ The total cost at the time of transition to the Greek Ministry of Public Works was \$56 of an estimated \$70 million.¹⁴⁸ The Afghans have over 25,000 miles of roads, about half of which are paved; planners recognize the importance of the 1,925-mile ring road built by the

¹⁴³ FM 3-07, 3-18.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

¹⁴⁵ Mashack, 49

¹⁴⁶ Robert P. Grathwol, and Donita M. Moorhus, *Bricks, Sand, and Marble: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Construction in the Mediterranean and Middle East, 1947-1991* (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History/U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 2009), 10; David Ricks, “Kilcullen (I): What not to measure in a COIN Campaign” *Foreign Policy*, (February 8, 2010), http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/02/08/kilcullen_here_is_what_not_to_measure_in_a_coin_campaign (accessed March 6, 2011).

¹⁴⁷ Grathwol, 15.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., 16.

U.S. and Soviets during the Cold War that connects the cities.¹⁴⁹ The Kabul – Kandahar link of this road is an example of planned development designed to improve opportunity for large blocks of the population.¹⁵⁰ The U.S. and Asian Development Bank are sharing the estimated \$2.5 billion dollar reconstruction cost.¹⁵¹ Both Greek and Afghan insurgents targeted their respective projects. Where the Greek insurgents destroyed equipment and took hostages for ransom, Afghan insurgents added killing to the tactics employed by the Greeks, driving up project costs through inflated wages and contract security.¹⁵² The cost of rebuilding the Greek rail system is included in the \$56 million dollar investment.¹⁵³ The Asian Development Bank and China invested over \$8.165 billion dollars in two Afghan railroad projects intended to link the Uzbek border and Mazar e Sharif, and a 434-mile line to connect Pakistan and Kabul to the Aynak copper mines.¹⁵⁴ Reconstruction of transportation infrastructure is an essential element of restoring the economic and industrial base that ultimately sustains the military logistical system.

U.S. doctrine further recognizes the importance of providing employment and transitioning these enterprises to the local population, and provides a list of tasks intended to promote economic development.”¹⁵⁵ These principles apply to both 1947 Greece and present day Afghanistan. Investment in Greece emphasized creating the industrial capacity and infrastructure for commerce. AMAG advisors saw an opportunity to expand the Greek economy beyond the

¹⁴⁹ CIA World Factbook, website, “Afghanistan, industry” <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/docs/notesanddefs.html?countryName=Afghanistan&countryCode=af®ionCode=sas#2116> (accessed February 5, 2011).

¹⁵⁰ *FM 3-07*, C4.

¹⁵¹ Peter Wonacott, “Afghan Road Project Shows Bumps in Drive for Stability,” *Wall Street Journal, Digital Network*, August 17, 2003, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125046546672735403.html> (accessed February 5, 2011).

¹⁵² Grathwol, 15.

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*, 13.

¹⁵⁴ Asian Development Bank, “Factsheet,” Regions and Countries, Central and West Asia, Afghanistan, April 2010, 2, http://www.adb.org/Documents/Fact_Sheets/AFG.pdf (accessed February 5, 2010); CNN World, Online, “After nearly a century, a modern Afghan railroad is under construction,” September 27, 2010, <http://afghanistan.blogs.cnn.com/2010/09/27/after-nearly-a-century-a-modern-afghan-railroad-is-under-construction/> (accessed February 5, 2010).

¹⁵⁵ *FM 3-07*, 3-15.

prewar capacity, through the resuscitation of a government, military, and a residual economic base through partnership with Greek industrialists to build the economic foundation to sustain the GNA through manufacturing uniforms and other combat equipment.¹⁵⁶ AMAG's coordinated efforts contributed to economic development and ultimately restored public confidence.¹⁵⁷ The Marshall plan logically addressed and executed economic recovery through building sustainable economic and industrial capacity in Europe and selected areas in the Pacific. The AMAG effort in Greece was an extension of that larger plan. This is the essential difference between the AMAG mission to Greece and the U.S. and NATO mission in Afghanistan. The U.S. and NATO lacked a holistic approach to developing the economic and industrial bases until the Afghans published the Afghan National Development Strategy in 2008. The reconstruction effort lacked coordination beyond the supporting Provincial Reconstruction Team or NATO force. However, there are signs of change. In 2009, for instance, the NTM-A helped the Afghans establish a factory to manufacture ANSF uniforms, linking an existing textile manufacturing capability to a military requirement. Boots intended for the ANA made by the Kabul Milli Trading Company passed a MoD quality control test.¹⁵⁸ The ISAF commander believes investment in cold storage facilities will encourage Afghan farmers to grow pomegranates instead of marijuana and poppies.¹⁵⁹

Post-war Greek trade opportunities were limited to maritime trade with Western Europe, Turkey, and Africa because Soviet bloc nations controlled the northern borders. Heavy construction in Greece between 1950 and 1973 spurred the Greek economic miracle described as

¹⁵⁶ Mashack, 42.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

¹⁵⁸ Kevin Heineman, "Afghan Forces Hitting The Ground In Afghan-Made Boots," <http://www.ntm-a.com/news/1-categorynews/1274-hitting-the-ground-running-in-new-afghan-boots?lang=> (accessed February 5, 2011); Marc I. Lane, "Afghan National Army Receives New Uniforms," *The Enduring Ledger* (August 2009), 20, <http://www.cstc-a.com/News/enduring%20ledgers/2009endledger/AugustEL.pdf> (accessed February 5, 2011).

¹⁵⁹ Joel Klein, "What It Will Take To Finish The Job In Afghanistan," *Time*, January 6, 2009, 1, <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2040968,00.html> (accessed February 21, 2009).

7% economic growth.¹⁶⁰ Large-scale economic opportunity is developing rapidly in Afghanistan – GDP growth for 2009-2010 was 22.5%.¹⁶¹ Afghans are working to develop regional trading partners to generate revenues required to support the ANA. As an example, representatives from Afghan Ministries met with delegates from over 50 nations during the first Afghan investment conference.¹⁶² The NY Times reported an estimated trillion dollars' worth of untapped mineral used in modern industry, India is funding the construction of power lines in the north, and China is investing in copper mines and building a railroad to move the extracted minerals.¹⁶³

Afghanistan's land locked location can become a competitive economic advantage as a regional crossroads for trade from the Persian Gulf to China and India as well as the Caucasus to the Indian Ocean. Energy companies plan to build liquid natural gas pipelines from the Caspian Sea to Pakistan seaports. However, these opportunities require marked improvements in Afghan security that in turn requires the ANA to possess organic logistics capacity to sustain forces throughout the country.¹⁶⁴

The salvage yards established by JUSMAG were the precursors to the GNA logistical system. They challenged insurgent control by providing opportunities for local workers and by

¹⁶⁰ Thomas White, "Greece: Rising from the Ashes of Public Debt," Thomas White-Global Investing, <http://www.thomaswhite.com/explore-the-world/greece.aspx> (accessed February 25, 2011).

¹⁶¹ U.S. Department of State, "Background Notes, Afghanistan, Economy" December 6, 2010, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5380.htm#econ> (accessed March 6, 2011).

¹⁶² Frozan Rahmani, "Afghan investment conference opens in UAE," *Pajhwok Afghan News*, November 30, 2011, <http://www.pajhwok.com/en/2010/11/30/afghanistan-investment-conference-opens-uae> (accessed January 26 2011) The United Arab Emirates sponsored the conference in November 2010.

¹⁶³ James Risen, "U.S. Discovers Vast Mineral Riches in Afghanistan," *The New York Times*, June 13, 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/14/world/asia/14minerals.html> (accessed January 26, 2011); Emily Wax, "Indian investment in Afghanistan comes with a Price," *The Herald Sun*, February 27, 2011, http://www.heraldsun.com/view/full_story/6935534/article-Indian-investment-in-Afghanistan-comes-with-price (accessed February 27, 2011); Michael Wines, "China Willing to Spend Big on Afghan Commerce" *The New York Times*, December 29, 2009, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/30/world/asia/30mine.html> (accessed February 3, 2011). "This will become the backbone of the Afghan economy," said Jalil Jumriany, an adviser to the Afghan minister of mines." India invests \$1.3 billion in power lines in northern Afghanistan.

¹⁶⁴ Borzou Daragahi, "Afghanistan's President Karzai signs deal on gas pipeline project," *The Los Angeles Times*, December 10, 2010, <http://articles.latimes.com/2010/dec/12/world/la-fg-afghanistan-bombings-20101212> (accessed February 5, 2011).

reinforcing GNA communications, both of which built trust in the system. Afghans are currently operating a series of national and forward support depots that sustain the bulk of the ANA's logistical requirements.¹⁶⁵ Depot 0 serves as the ANA central supply depot and is unique because Afghans completely manage the supply system, supporting units with items such as vehicle parts, uniforms, weapons, and medical supplies.¹⁶⁶

U.S. efforts in Greece successfully rebuilt the nation from the ashes of World War II. The focused investment in transportation infrastructure, industrial capacity, large-scale economic development, and the GNA salvage yards are techniques that can be applied to Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, as in Greece, these techniques can form a holistic approach to creating the economic and industrial base necessary to support national stability while improving the army's capacity to defeat an insurgency.

Challenges to Establishing an Afghan Economic Base

There is little doubt the U.S. and the International Community (IC) are dedicated to investing in Afghanistan's future. Their efforts are attempting to develop and rebuild the economic and industrial base that is essential for both Afghan stability and a self-sustaining ANA. According to Thomas Barfield, the U.S. and international efforts at improving Afghan infrastructure in terms of rural electrification, farm to market roads, irrigation projects, and crop improvement have failed.¹⁶⁷ These efforts completely missed the scale required in spite of billions of dollars invested. Therefore, the problem lies not in the effort or investment in development, but

¹⁶⁵ Strobe, 36.

¹⁶⁶ Tamara Gonzales, "Supplying Afghan National Security Forces," June 24, 2010, <http://www.ntm-a.com/news/categories/logistics/967-supplying-afghan-national-security-forces?lang=> (accessed February 5, 2011).

¹⁶⁷ Barfield, 313; National Security Network, "Afghanistan Reconstruction: the Missing Link" (April 17, 2008). <http://www.nsnetwork.org/node/828> (accessed March 6, 2011).

in that it lacks an Afghan face, lacks coordination, and does not account for regional interests, security, and unintended consequences.¹⁶⁸

The GNA of 132,000 maintained a Greek face and allowed JUSMAG's 350 advisors to focus its developmental effort on the army, corps, and division general staffs. The U.S. could not apply this technique in Afghanistan because of the absence of any security forces beyond the regional warlords. The U.S. and NATO created the Afghan government and ANA from scratch while simultaneously fighting the insurgency. U.S. troop levels in Afghanistan reached 98,000 in September 2010, which does not include contractors or NATO forces.¹⁶⁹ ISAF recruited and trained the current force of 134,000 in order to establish an ANA face on this war by 2014.¹⁷⁰ The U.S. mission to Greece lasted for two intensive years; financial aid continued after the fact and totaled over \$5 billion. The U.S. and International Community Support (IC) have spent billions in Afghanistan and have achieved poor results. Lack of coordination and constant transition of military and aid workers eliminates continuity within programs and perpetuates poor results.¹⁷¹ The Afghan National Development Strategy is an Afghan product that represents a holistic approach to enable progress. Because the ANDS has its origins with Afghans, and reflects Afghan culture, it should not face resistance in the way a strictly NATO proposal might. Afghans expect speed from the IC and NATO to change conditions on one hand, but refuse to adopt new

¹⁶⁸ Christopher J. Coyne, "The Politics of Bureaucracy and the Failure of Post War Reconstruction" Mercatus Center, George Mason University, Working Paper 88, http://mercatus.org/sites/default/files/publication/Politics_of_Bureaucracy%281%29.pdf (accessed March 6, 2011). Coyne analyzes the differences between the reconstruction efforts in Germany and Japan and current efforts. Coyne attributes the reconstruction failures to bureaucratic inability to coordinate in unity of effort outside the specific organization and seeking short-term gains over the long-term success. The authors state the U.S. efforts to install liberal democratic institutions in weak and failed states tend to fail.

¹⁶⁹ Andrew Tilghman, "New Afghanistan troop request aimed at NATO," *Navy Times Online*, September 7, 2010, <http://www.navytimes.com/news/2010/09/military-afghanistan-troop-levels-090710w/> (accessed January 22, 2010).

¹⁷⁰ *Afghanistan Security*, 4.

¹⁷¹ Robert Adams "Doctrine and Reality in Afghanistan," *Survival*, 51: 1, 32. http://pdfserve.informaworld.com/981982__908599255.pdf (accessed February 21, 2011). "The involvement of outsiders has one further special characteristic: it is based on short-term tours of duty, so there is remarkably limited institutional memory, especially as regards knowledge of local communities and political traditions."

ideas at a speed beyond their culturally accepted pace.¹⁷² It remains to be seen how the ANDS and the supporting U.S. Civil Military Campaign Plan will grow, since regional powers all seek strategic opportunity and will strive to promote their national interests.

The complexity of Afghanistan's regional relationships threatens to stifle the development of the economic and industrial bases through policies intended to disrupt their competitors' efforts to build trade and military relations. Each nation in this region has its own policy of implementing Afghan relations to further its strategic aims. Afghans acknowledge that the U.S and NATO will eventually leave, and the long distances limit long-term involvement.¹⁷³ Chinese policy seeks to extract resources, and remains aloof from sovereign national politics.¹⁷⁴ While Iran's policy toward Afghanistan remains unclear, annual trade between the two countries totals over \$500 million.¹⁷⁵ Afghani and Pakistani relations suffer from inherent tensions between development and security interests. Pakistan links all strategy to India; therefore, Pakistan must minimize Afghan relationships with India and views its relationship to the Taliban as a strategic imperative.¹⁷⁶ The Pakistan government views insurgents fighting in Afghanistan as weapons for use against India.¹⁷⁷ Pakistani intelligence used the training facilities funded by the U.S. and Saudi Arabia to train and equip mujahedeen for employment in Kashmir.¹⁷⁸ India's relationship with Afghanistan intends to economically counterbalance Pakistan, increase its trade and industry, and indirectly apply its soft power. India has provided Afghanistan over \$1.2 billion in

¹⁷² deVillafranca, 87.

¹⁷³ Ibid., 87.

¹⁷⁴ David Pulling, "Beijing's Foreign Policy," *Financial Times*, FT.Com, January 19, 2011. <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/56a99fdc-2405-11e0-00144feab49a.html> (accessed February 21, 2011).

¹⁷⁵ Greg Bruno, "Iran and the future of Afghanistan," <http://www.cfr.org/iran/iran-future-afghanistan/p13578> (accessed February 5, 2010). U.S. view as either "encouraging chaos to consume American attention" or "eliminating the Taliban as an "affront to Islam."

¹⁷⁶ Omar Sharifi, "Pakistan's Foreign Policy toward Afghanistan from 1947-2008," <http://www.en.afghanistan.ru/doc/130.html> (accessed February, 5, 2011); deVillafranca, 92.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.

¹⁷⁸ Steve Coll, *Ghost Wars, The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001* (New York: Penguin Press, 2004), 221.

aid since 2001, and its growing energy requirement strengthens Afghanistan's potential competitive advantage as a transportation link to the Persian Gulf. India provides Afghanistan with radio and television programming that does not create cultural tension.¹⁷⁹ The strategic goals of Afghanistan's neighbors present complex challenges to successfully building a stable economic and industrial base that will sustain the ANA and bring stability to the country. In spite of these regional tensions, Afghanistan must work to develop regional commerce as a source of government revenues to provide the necessary means to sustain the ANA.

Development of regional commerce represents both an opportunity to build the base and a challenge as the base depends on the ANSF to provide security. Projects on the scale of building railroads and extracting minerals represent enormous potential for revenues to sustain the Afghan state and its security forces, yet persistent threats continue to hamper international investment.¹⁸⁰ Where Greek insurgents limited themselves to sabotage of reconstruction equipment and facilities and did not deliberately target laborers, security concerns in Afghanistan have driven up project costs through delays from attacks, work stoppages, labor costs, an increase in the face of insurgent threats, and contract security.¹⁸¹ Multinational corporations, contractors, and Afghans trying to tap into the vast streams of foreign wealth prey upon projects intended to create business opportunities for Afghan companies. Furthermore, Afghans value the opportunities created by corporate investment and construction projects that require unskilled labor and security because the pay is higher than the government pay for soldiers and police. As a response, President Karzai has attempted to disarm domestic security companies and expel foreign companies in an effort to

¹⁷⁹ Jayshree Bajoria, "Backgrounder, India-Afghanistan Relations," July 22, 09, <http://www.cfr.Org/india/india-afghanistan-relations/p17474> (accessed February 10, 2011). "India is looking to ensure that other countries in the region favor or at least are neutral on its conflict with Pakistan," while Afghanistan, on the other hand, looks to India as "a potential counterweight in its relationship with Pakistan." "Indian television soaps and Indian films are very popular in Afghanistan and their particular strength is that they have nothing to do with government propaganda."

¹⁸⁰ CNN World, Online, "After nearly a century, a modern Afghan railroad is under construction," September 27, 2010, <http://afghanistan.blogs.cnn.com/2010/09/27/after-nearly-a-century-a-modern-afghan-railroad-is-under-construction/> (accessed February 5, 2010).

¹⁸¹ Grathwol, 15.

reduce competition and future threats. However, disarming these companies creates logistical challenges for the U.S. forces since they employ contract-trucking companies for sustainment operations.¹⁸² Further, the trade that does occur often funds not the state but the insurgency through security rackets, bribes, and insurgent checkpoints.¹⁸³ Afghan companies contract private security or, as some advisors assume, pay off the insurgents. Investment, construction, and development are potential sources for Taliban funding.¹⁸⁴ The challenge is devising methods to promote development in the outlying regions that view Kabul and other city dwellers as growing unimaginably wealthy.

Afghans are a high power distance culture; therefore, seeking wealth is a direct route to real power and is encouraged. Seeking wealth in the current situation leads toward widespread corruption from the western point of view. From a historical perspective, “the Iron Emir” tax collectors at every level between the village and Kabul skimmed a percentage of the revenue.¹⁸⁵ If for no other reason, the Afghans are a stable element within the overall system because they consistently behave in accordance with their cultural values. However, there is indication of change in the establishment of the High Office of Oversight as the Afghans’ main anti-corruption agency. It remains to be seen how political leaders will constrain its activities.¹⁸⁶

¹⁸² Ryan Greer, “The Karzai Contractor Ban: What Could be Next for Afghan Development,” *Georgetown Public Policy Review*, November 17, 2010, <http://www.gppreview.org/blog/2010/11/the-karzai-contractor-ban-what-could-be-next-for-afghanistans-development/> (accessed February 5, 2009).

¹⁸³ Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, *Warlord, Inc. Extortion and Corruption along the US Supply Chain in Afghanistan*, 111th Cong, Sess. 2, June 2010, 3, http://www.cbsnews.com/htdocs/pdf/HNT_Report.pdf?tag=contentMain;contentBody, (accessed February 5, 2011).

¹⁸⁴ Ibid.

¹⁸⁵ Barfield, 152.

¹⁸⁶ LuCelia Ball, “ISAF Works to Facilitate Anti-Corruption Activities,” ISAF, Home, News, <http://www.isaf.nato.int/article/news/isaf-works-to-facilitate-anti-corruption-activities.html> (accessed February 20, 2010); Amir Shah, “Karzai slams interference in Afghan affairs” *The Associated Press*, January 4, 2011, <http://www.armytimes.com/news/2011/01/ap-karzai-slams-interference-in-afghan-affairs-010411/> (accessed February 27, 2011). The agency provides oversight to the Ministry of Interior and Anti-Corruption Tribunal.

Reliance on foreign aid, black marketing, and the lack of infrastructure and industry add complexity to the problem. Foreign aid represents large role in modern Afghan military affairs, Afghan leaders dating back to Abdur Rahman relied on foreign aid to maintain militias or the army to avoid burdening the population.¹⁸⁷ U.S. aid alone totals over \$56 billion since 2001.¹⁸⁸ \$25 million dollars of Soviet aid in the form of tanks, jets, and rockets formed the first modern Afghan Army.¹⁸⁹ The Soviet Union struggled to forge a reliable and self-sustaining Afghan army during the 1980s with the intent the Afghans would conduct the bulk of the fighting, the Democratic Republic Army of Afghanistan (DRA) Army negotiated truces with the insurgents.¹⁹⁰ When the negotiated settlement of April 1988 ended the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, Soviet covert military aid continued in order to help the DRA reach ultimate victory.¹⁹¹ The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 ended the foreign aid that sustained the post-Soviet era military and the DRA's political influence through patronage. The economic factors that affect sustaining the ANA after coalition departure are the national income, estimated at \$1.5 billion, demand the ANA operate under an austere budget if it is to remain independent of foreign aid.¹⁹² International efforts to extract natural resources and licit agriculture offer enormous potential as future sources

¹⁸⁷ Barfield, 315.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid.

¹⁸⁹ Barfield, 209.

¹⁹⁰ Robert F. Bauman, "Russian-Soviet Unconventional Wars in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Afghanistan," *The Leavenworth Papers* Number 20 (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute, 1993) 165-169; Thomas Barfield, 238. This Army started at about 80,000. Defection and other problems were addressed through various measures until the strength stabilized at 40,000. Soviet compromises in training and discipline resulted in an army that was unable to fight without Soviet advisors or combat units. Thomas Barfield. 238.

¹⁹¹ Tanner, Stephen, *Afghanistan, A military History from Alexander the Great to the War Against the Taliban* (Philadelphia, PA: Da Capo Books, 2009), 272. Tanner states the Soviet Union provided aid in terms of weapons, munitions, and cash reached \$300 million per month by 1989. The U.S. reduced its support the mujahedeen to \$40-\$50 million from a peak of \$670 million in 1987.

¹⁹² *Afghanistan Security*, 32. The report states the ANA requires an estimated \$300 per year to sustain forces at about 171,000.

of revenue to fund the ANA in the post coalition era.¹⁹³ Black marketing, the shadow economy, the absence of legitimate institutions intensify smuggling, and contraband inside the country discourage the development of a taxable economy.¹⁹⁴ The long disputed border with Pakistan exploited by the Taliban – and the Mujahedeen before them – reinforces smuggling because “you cannot smuggle if there is no border.”¹⁹⁵ This attitude hobbles the established border controls and its potential for transportation revenues. Nations and corporations working to rebuild Afghanistan recognize the challenges of restoring security, electricity, and infrastructure.¹⁹⁶ However, their efforts can be counterproductive to the local economy because contractors that can afford to pay more than the government can afford to pay police and soldiers. This creates competition for the educated Afghan workers who also reinforce the shadow economy and disrupts efforts to rebuild the ANA and Police.¹⁹⁷

Building a self-sustaining ANA represents a series of national level challenges magnified in complexity by the effects of Afghan culture. The U.S. mission to Greece provides a model that can be adjusted for use in Afghanistan by carefully rebuilding infrastructure in accordance with a holistic vision, investing in indigenous industrial capacity to support the army, establishing security to leverage large-scale economic opportunity, and understanding the geopolitical challenges to establishing an Afghan economic and industrial base.

¹⁹³ Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, “Afghanistan National Development Strategy, 2008-2013,” 81. CNN Article Resources over 1 trillion.

¹⁹⁴ Reed, Slide 18.

¹⁹⁵ Barfield, 280.

¹⁹⁶ Dr. Omar Zakhilwal, “Afghanistan’s Investment Climate, An interview with Dr. Omar Zakhilwal,” Kabul Center for Strategic Studies, May 1, 2008, <http://kabulcenter.org/?p=139> (accessed February 18, 2011). Dr. Omar Zakhilwal is the president and CEO of the Afghanistan Investment Support Agency (AISA), an organization set up to support investors interested in Afghanistan.

¹⁹⁷ LTG David M. Rodriguez, “Afghan SAMS Briefing,” (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, November 15, 2010), 4.

Conclusion

Creating a self-sustaining Army in the time available requires the U.S and NATO to create certain key conditions for long-term success. The defeat of Al Qaeda in Afghanistan is important to the U.S., but nine years of effort have shown that too great a focus on military objectives will not alone create the conditions needed for long-term national stability. A broader, more sustainable success requires that the economic instrument, one of the most powerful instruments of national power, be wielded with the same level of resolve and discipline that has been applied to the military instrument.¹⁹⁸ Sustainable security requires not just the physical security that can be provided by Afghan military forces, but also the economic security needed to support the physical security apparatus, provide for the revenue needs of the state writ large, and provide an incentive for the populace to embrace national progress.

If, as former United States National Security Advisor James L. Jones and the former Afghan Economic Minister Dr. Ali recognized that economic reconstruction is essential to the creation of Afghan statehood, then the efforts of the U.S. to deal simultaneously with both physical and economic security in a Greek state devastated by WWII can provide a useful example of the effective marriage of these two pillars of state security.¹⁹⁹ Afghanistan has tremendous economic potential in terms of agriculture, resource extraction, and right of way for oil and natural gas pipelines running between the Caspian Sea and Pakistan. Fully developing this economic potential is the key to success for establishing a self-sustaining Afghan National Army, through the generation of revenue to finance Army operations, industry to equip and maintain the Army, and employment to reduce the ranks of the insurgency.

However, if the U.S. and NATO are to fully take on the dual tasks of physical and economic security, their efforts must work within the existing cultural contexts of the region. On

¹⁹⁸ COL Harry Lebouf Jr., “The Economic Instrument of National Power and its Relevance to Strategic Military Leaders” (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, April 1999), 1.

¹⁹⁹ Mashack, 40.

a regional level, this means leveraging regional partnerships in the building of lasting economic relationships that do not upset the existing equilibrium. On a national and local level, this means building governmental, military, and economic structures that reflect the values and traditions of the Afghan people, while incorporating the best practices of governments, militaries, and businesses around the globe.

Combining the lessons learned from the American experience in Greece and the observations from the TLog study group provide us with the key components of a general scheme to achieve self-sustainability, with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) completely responsible for sustaining its security forces. If economic and physical security are pursued together, future Afghan governments will be able provide for the operating budget of their security forces through economic revenues. To accomplish this, the state requires a national economic base built on a diversity of revenues collected from regional trade, energy pipelines, local agriculture, light industry, and extraction of minerals. In turn, the national economic base requires infrastructure within the country that is developed to the point where each village can easily reach provincial markets. Robust light industry could provide the ANSF with much of its material requirements, manufactured within the country using organic or raw materials. Finally, sufficient organization of logistical elements within the Afghan National Army would ensure distribution of resources to sustain operations and training. In order for this larger system to be truly sustainable however, coalition efforts to foster economic development and military logistics systems will have to apply the notion of “Afghan Right,” meaning the engines of economic production and distribution need to be owned and operated by Afghans using organizational structures, practices, and doctrine built on a foundation of Afghan cultural values.

The Afghan National Development Strategy provides a holistic approach effort to establish a foundation for self-sufficiency. Just as the Greek aid mission was a logical branch of the overall Marshall plan, collective Afghan and NATO efforts must establish a firm direction for the employment of US efforts into the economic instrument. Development of Afghanistan’s

infrastructure is a logical investment for both economic and physical security. Creating farm to market roads helps move goods from the outlying regions to larger markets, while reducing travel time and cost, which provides incentive for increased trade. Additionally, these roads provide the ANSF with roads for moving forces and sustainment. Developing light industry, such as uniform factories and other light accoutrements for the army creates jobs in direct manufacture and ancillary businesses, and provides the basis for wider economic development, as was the case in Greece. International investment in these projects removes the US from Taliban information operations. The ANDS provides an Afghan framework for synchronizing the development of the economic and industrial bases with supporting infrastructure.

Restructuring the logistics organization must include changes at the national level to reduce inefficiencies between the MoD and the corps logistics echelons. Restructuring provides the Corps commander opportunities to leverage national supply points and regional vendors. ANA corps logistical battalion operates the forward depots. Under the logistics battalion, they add a depot and distribution company with a corps and mobile forward support detachment. The depot and distribution company operates the former forward support depot. They also add an acquisition company to provide each corps the means to conduct local purchase of supplies and services. These changes place responsibility directly on the regional commanders. Elimination of a layer of bureaucracy and depot management reduces the delays and a layer of corruption.

A regionally focused logistical system, as recommended by MAJ Reed and his team, stimulates regional development and embraces Afghan culture. Regional focus builds on the infrastructure putting the ANSF in region as a large consumer and source of prestige. Military spending in the region creates the potential for more opportunities in the outlying regions. Regionally focused logistics embraces the patronage and payoff aspect of Afghan culture. The proposed system installs the Corps commander as a regional leader. Second, the adjusted system creates employment opportunities around each regional garrison in fabrication, agriculture,

transportation, and other trades. The regional garrisons can employ mechanics, clerks, and laborers.

Combining the proposed adjustments as recommended by the TLog team to the logistical structure that leverages the stronger aspects of Afghan culture with a holistic approach defined in the Afghan National Development Strategy to building economic and industrial capacity can set conditions for a self-sustaining ANA. Two recommendations for further research can help to identify an effective sustainment doctrine that falls between the U.S. and Soviet models. The first is to search out a middle road weighted toward eastern culture. This can be conducted at any time, but sooner would be better, as it could help adjust training for the ANA Logisticians. The second would require a longer length of time to collect and collate the relevant data for research, then analyze and recommend how the ANA logistics could evolve over time from the U.S. model to something truly Afghan. The resulting recommendation would be valuable since it will record the development of the ANA logistic system and its supporting national economic and industrial base.

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